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ABSTRACT
Critical-Incident Response:
A Study of Training, Management & Mitigation in
North Carolina Sheriffs’ Offices

by
Gregory A. Minton

The purpose of this study was to determine the amount of training each sheriff’s office requires
in North Carolina and if that training includes multiagency exercises designed to mitigate a
critical-incident response and identify any concerns from those training events. The study also
compared departmental strength (number of sworn officers per agency) with county populations
and geographic area of the state the agency is located in with the number of hours required
annually by each agency. Finally, each agency was asked if it had participated in a multiagency
exercise and a multiagency incident and to identify any issues that occurred within that training
or response.

This research indicated that over half of the sheriffs’ offices had completed mandated training
beyond what North Carolina requires. Only slight differences between regions of the state
(mountains, piedmont, or coastal plain) were detected as well as slight differences within the
county populations. However, it was discovered that the size of a sheriff’s office did have
significance; larger sheriff’s offices often required more training than smaller offices. Sheriff’s
offices that had experienced multiagency exercises and multiagency incidents were more likely
to exceed the North Carolina minimum training requirements as well. Finally, respondents who
had participated in either a multiagency exercise or a multiagency incident indicated common
problems and concerns within those responses. The reoccurring problems and concerns were;
communications, training, and organization or combinations of the three.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

The events of September 11, 2001, truly did change every aspect of American lives
(September 11 news, 2001-2008) & (MSNBC News, 2006). Immediately after the attacks,
several positive changes were observed – for example, larger blood bank donations (Parlikar,
2003) and greater recognition for firefighters and rescue workers (Walker, 2001) . Attorney
General John Ashcroft led a series of legislative reforms that directly impacted law enforcement
and the rules surrounding how law enforcement and the federal government in general can
combat terrorism (Lithwick & Turner, 2003). Most of those amendments were collapsed into the
Patriot Act (US Patriot Act H.R. 3162, 2001) legislation that has been the lightning rod for
heated debate or over whether the Bush administration went too far in its attempts to save the
country from another 9/11-caliber event (Vlahos, 2003).
There is one concrete manner in which law enforcement has improved in recent years,
especially since the tragedy of 9/11, and this improvement has continued well beyond the initial
attacks (Chapman & Scheider, 2002). Currently, local, state, and federal law enforcement
agencies, more than at any other time in history, work together with their fellow branches on
every level: training, information gathering, action, and postmortem analysis of a criticalincident. Possible solutions for better collaboration between agencies are absolutely essential in
determining the correct future paths of law enforcement and incident management agencies.
Furthermore, they are critical in determining what more needs to be done by national, state, and
local agencies to safeguard America from manmade and natural disasters for the decades to
come (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 2004).
The lack of cooperation and historical patterns of territorialism have been addressed
within the United States intelligence organizations. Shortly after 9/11, the Central Intelligence
Agency, the National Security Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and many other
organizations became controlled by one “terrorism czar” (Posner, 2006, ¶ 9). The challenges that
these organizations face in integrating their practices, subverting their leaders’ individual egos,
and training their multitude of forces and employees are echoed in the challenges that law
enforcement and incident management agencies will face in the coming years with regard to
their own costly and complicated integration (Posner, 2006,).
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Possible solutions to managing an all-hazards event (natural or manmade) are absolutely
integral in determining the correct actions various law enforcement and incident management
agencies will use in future events; furthermore, they are critical in identifying what steps should
be taken by national, state, and local agencies to safeguard the United States homeland from
other disasters for the decades to come (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon
America, 2004). In 2007 Congress appropriated funding for law enforcement and incident
management cooperation; it was up to individual agencies to implement programs to assist in
mitigation of terrorist acts (Antiterrorism and Emergency Assistance Program, 2008).
With regard to both incident cooperation and training, several initiatives have been put
into place to facilitate better cooperation between various facets and arms of law enforcement in
the United States. For instance, the Incident Command System (Incident Management Team,
2008) and the National Incident Management System (NIMS Training, 2008) are two protocols
by which various agencies with law enforcement, rescue, and fire personnel work together to
prevent a cataclysmic event from taking place and, if such an event does take place, to minimize
the damage.
With budget cuts in some areas and budget booms in others plus priority given by federal
legislators to biochemical warfare protection versus more ordinary local law enforcement (Grant
Writing USA, 2007), the concept of cooperation is diluted and is rendered much more
exasperating. There is very little direction as to which agencies supersede other agencies and also
which priorities within particular agencies supersede others. In essence, incident managers must
consider the practical takeaways – not only the macro-level policy determinations – associated
with the Incident Command System (ICS) and the National Incident Management System
(NIMS) (United States Environmental Protection Agency, 1998). Indeed, to draw the analysis
down to the lowest common denominator, local law enforcement agencies benefit from the new
cross-training initiatives and cooperation with national and state agencies (Freudenthal, 2005)
Incident Managers are unclear as to how to maximize benefits and utilities from these new
allocations and programs. Furthermore, postincident analysis (FEMA ICS100.a, 2009, ¶ 2) has
identified a few major concerns that if not resolved could hamper or cripple the mediation
process.
Consequently, research concerning the current level of integration in both incident
management and incident prevention, along with cooperation in training, must be performed in
9

order to paint an adequate picture of where the baseline is now (Burgie, 2009) and more
importantly, where law enforcement should have been concentrating training efforts
(Muhlhausen, 2002).
According to Cole (2000) the historical model of Incident Command has its basis within
the fire service. He also notes that migration into nation-wide local law enforcement agencies for
wide scale acceptance and implementation has been problematic. North Carolina in 2008-2009
mandated only 24 hours of in-service training per certified officer (North Carolina Criminal
Justice and Sheriffs’. Mandated In-Service Training, 2008). Not one of the required training
topics addresses Incident Command, Incident Management or the National Incident Management
System (NIMS). This specialized training is left up to individual law enforcement entities having
to comply with Homeland Security Presidential Directive /HSPD-5 (HSPD-5, 2003). To assist
with compliance to this directive, specific federal funding initiatives are withheld until units have
been met or exceeded the requirement (FEMA, 2007). The certification procedure is quite simple
because all training is provided through an on-line access with FEMA Emergency Management
Institute or delivered by certified instructors in a web blended class environment (FEMA, 2008).

Statement of the Problem

This researcher seeks to determine the extent to which various local law enforcement
agencies work together on cross-training projects primarily within neighboring local
jurisdictions’ response to critical-incidents. The goals of this research are 1) to identify the
dynamics that interplay between agency cooperation in incident management and law
enforcement; 2) to determine what is being done to enhance the public’s security; 3) to determine
what is not being done; and 4) to address recommendations for the future via data analysis and
the presentation of the findings for future cooperation, cross-training efforts and future grant
applications designed to mitigate the cost of implementation of such a program.
Since 9/11 there has been considerable discussion among first-responder agencies and
cross-training with other agencies outside their specific disciplines; however, there are no
standards, mandates, or regulations in place that require agencies to engage in first-responder
cross-training events.
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Research Questions

This study examines the extent to which cooperation and training exists to address major
incidents involving multiple-disciplinary critical-response agencies with sheriffs’ offices in
North Carolina. The following six questions served as a research guide for this study:

1. Do North Carolina sheriffs’ offices complete more training than the North Carolina
Sheriffs’ Training & Standards Division require?
2. Are any differences in training related to agency size, region of the state, or county
size in requiring additional departmentally mandated training hours?
3. Is there a difference between agencies that have had a multiagency exercise and
increased training hour requirement and agencies that meet only North Carolina
training minimums and had not participated in a multiagency exercise?
4. Is there a difference between agencies that have experienced a multiagency response
incident with increased training hour requirement and agencies that have met only
North Carolina training minimums and had not experienced a multiagency response?
5. For the agencies that participated in an annual multiagency critical-incident exercise,
what problems were identified within those exercises?
6. For agencies that experienced a multiagency critical-incident, what were problems
encountered within during responses?

Significance of the Study

This study should provide both historical assessment of local agencies use and nonuse of
the Incident Command System or variations of those organizational elements specified within
the National Incident Management System (NIMS). Analysis of the reported problems should
lead to recommendations for the future of critical-incident management as it pertains to law
enforcement roles and responsibilities when responding to and managing incidents.
Researchers should be able to use this study as a baseline when developing micro-policy
measures to dictate how cross-training within the National Incident Management System and
Incident Management System should proceed. The significance is that the same number of
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resources and the same degree of funding will result in a more efficient law enforcement and
critical-incident management environment, which will in turn manifest a safer public and
stronger homeland security. Local law enforcement and first responders will be able to look to
the findings from this research as a tangible guide for this new era of cooperation and crosstraining.

Definitions of Terms

FIRESCOPE- Firefighting Resources of Southern California Organized for Potential
Emergencies. A management design for critical-incidents. The result of the 1970 wild land fires
in southern California. Major participating agencies included the Forest Service of the U.S.
Department of Agriculture, California Department of Forestry, California Office of Emergency
Management and the fire departments of Los Angeles City and the Counties of Los Angeles,
Santa Barbara, and Ventura (Chase, 1980).
Incident Command System (ICS)- a set of personnel, policies, procedures, facilities, and
equipment, integrated into a common organizational structure designed to improve emergency
response operations of all types and complexities (FEMA IS100.a, 2009).
Interoperable Communications- the ability to communicate will all federal, state, and local
responders during a specific incident or event (EHS Today, 2010).
National Contingency Plan (NCP)The first National Contingency Plan was developed and
published in 1968 in response to a massive oil spill from the oil tanker Torrey Canyon off the
coast of England the year before. More than 37 million gallons of crude oil spilled into the water,
causing massive environmental damage. To avoid the problems faced by response officials
involved in this incident, U.S. officials developed a coordinated approach to cope with potential
spills in U.S. waters. The 1968 plan provided the first comprehensive system of accident
reporting, spill containment, and cleanup, and established a response headquarters, a national
reaction team, and regional reaction teams (precursors to the current National Response Team
and Regional Response Teams) United States Environmental Protection Agency (2010).
National Incident Command System (NIMS)- NIMS incorporates incident management best
practices developed and proven by thousands of responders and authorities across America.
These practices, coupled with consistency and national standardization, will now be carried
forward throughout all incident management processes: exercises, qualification and certification,
communications interoperability, doctrinal changes, training, and publications, public affairs,
equipping, evaluating, and incident management. All of these measures unify the response
community as never before (FEMA IS700.a, 2009).
National Interagency Incident Management System (NIIMS)- First major revision of the ICS
model (1981-82) adapting ICS to an “all hazards” approach. NIIMS is comprised of five major
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subgroups, incident command system, training, certification and qualifications, publication
management, supporting technology (Integrated Publishing, 2009)
Unified Command (UC)- UC is a structure that brings together the "Incident Commanders" of all
major organizations involved in the incident in order to coordinate an effective response while at
the same time carrying out their own jurisdictional responsibilities. The UC links the
organizations responding to the incident and provides a forum for these entities to make
consensus decisions. Under the UC, the various jurisdictions and/or agencies and nongovernment responders may blend together throughout the operation to create an integrated
response team (Unified Command, 2008).

Delimitations and limitations

The limitations of this study are typical of those that employ surveys. The data gathered
are only as accurate as the respondents’ knowledge of local training requirements and current
issues concerning critical-incident management and the respondents’ willingness to accurately
share the information.
The study is delimited to the 100 sheriff’s offices in North Carolina.

Organization of the Study

This study is organized into five chapters. Chapter 1 includes an introduction, statement
of the problem, research questions, significance of the study, definitions of terms, and
delimitations and limitations. Chapter 2 is a review of the literature of incident management and
critical response debriefs and findings. Chapter 3 describes the methodology and procedures that
were used for the survey. Chapter 4 is a presentation of the data gathered. Chapter 5 is a
summary of the findings from data analysis and recommendations for future research and to
improve practice.
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CHAPTER 2
REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE

This literature review presents the history, evolution, and current mandates of criticalincident management as it relates to local and state governments. The analysis examines past
implementation and needs identified from those events. Additional literature is reviewed to stress
prior deficiencies identified and their recommendations for mitigation strategies in future use.

Incident Command System: The Beginning

One of the most widely recognized ways in which various national, state, and local
agencies cooperate and mitigate emergencies is through the Incident Command System (ICS)
(Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2000). In response to the devastating 1970 brushfire season in
southern California, one of the worst in American history, a group of local, state, and federal fire
agencies developed the Incident Command System (ICS) (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2000,
p.11). The consortium, called FIRESCOPE, sought to design a procedure to facilitate the smooth
connection and linkage of multiple agencies to respond effectively to sudden overwhelming
threats (Center for Disease Control, 2004). Cardwell and Cooney (2000) stated;
Neither the birth of ICS among Southern California's wildland fire agencies nor its slow
adoption and internalization by law enforcement is surprising. Fire agencies in Southern
California face unique challenges every summer when hot, dry “Santa Ana” winds render
management of vegetation fires in foothill communities nearly impossible (p.11).
With the possibility of loss of life and extreme costs in property damage from these
incidents, it is natural that a very efficient interagency emergency response system came into
being (Cardwell & Clooney, 2000). Seven fire agencies initially developed what is known as the
Incident Command System (ICS) in 1972 (Cole, 2000). However, it was not until 1984 and the
summer Olympics that were held in Los Angeles did ICS practices begin to be adopted within
law enforcement (Cardwell & Clooney, 2000). Some local critical-incident management
agencies across the nation, including both law enforcement and fire fighting, discovered ICS
through their communication and working relationship with the U.S. Forest Service, which had
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been one of the original FIRESCOPE participants and held a major responsibility in the initial
development of ICS shortly after the 1970 California wildfires (Irwin, 2000).
The United States policy on managing critical-incidents involving terrorism has evolved
significantly in the last 38 years. In 1972 the National Contingency Plan (NCP) was amended to
include oil spills and hazardous material releases. The NCP was the initial approach to mandate
multiple agencies, teams, and individuals from federal, state, and local governments and private
organizations to focus all their response activities on the mitigation of a specific incident
(USGAO, 1997, p.17). In 1985 recommendations were made following the Vice-President’s
Task Force on Terrorism. The task force stressed the need for improved centralized interagency
coordination of the federal government’s significant assets to respond to terrorist incidents
(USGAO, 1997, p.17). This recommendation was targeted at global incidents; however, it also
assigned a National Security Council (NSC) group to coordinate a national response and
identified the primary federal agencies responsibilities overseas and within the U.S. The State
Department was delegated as the lead agency for international terrorism policy, procedures and
programs, and the FBI was assigned as the lead agency for managing acts of domestic terrorism.
In 1986 President Ronald Reagan formalized the task force’s recommendations into National
Security Decision Directive 207 (USGAO, 1997, p.17).
The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act was signed into
law on November 23, 1988. The act established a statutory authority for a federal response in the
event of a disaster or other emergency declared by the President. It places the initial response on
the shoulders of each state. If the incident required federal resources, those would be
immediately assigned by the President, but in most incidents the state would be responsible for
crisis management and as the incident stabilized the state would be responsible for consequence
management as well. If any state encounters difficultly at any point the state could request
specific assets from the federal government under the Federal Response Plan (USGAO, 1997,
p.58). The Stafford Act identifies FEMA as the lead agency for consequence management as
well as giving FEMA the authority to assign missions to any federal resource with the approval
of the President.
In 1995 Presidential Decision Directive 39 (PDD 39) was signed. This directive
expanded the federal response and established a “national policy, a strategy, and an interagency
coordination mechanism and management structure to combat terrorism” (USGAO, 1997, p.17).
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Three specific federal priorities were established to counter acts of terrorism (1) prevent and
deter terrorism; (2) respond to terrorist threats or incidents; and (3) manage the consequences of
a terrorist act. PDD 39 also delegated the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) as
the lead agency in charge of consequence management, the aftermath of an incident, and the
maintenance of the Federal Response Plan (USGAO, 1997). PDD-39 also gives the FBI a
mandate to engage in pre incident developing, prioritizing, and dissemination of processed
intelligence to other federal, state, and local entities to “eliminate the threat by recovering and
neutralizing any devices and apprehending perpetrators”. This intelligence must be legally
obtained and distributed to all authorized member agencies (Rohen, 2001, ¶ 26).
The National Interagency Incident Management System (NIIMS) adopted the concept
that has now been adopted in many fire agencies coast-to-coast, as well as in a few nonfire
agencies, most importantly and famously the Coast Guard (United States Coast Guard, 2000).
The Coast Guard became the first national organization to integrate ICS policy within its core
response protocol.
ICS adoption continued to spread nationwide. Indeed, the National Fire Academy, which
is administered by the Federal Emergency Management Agency, teaches the concept of ICS
collaboration and both the National Fire Protection Association and the National Wildfire
Coordinating Group employ ICS. ICS has also received much legislative backing, for instance
California (California Code, 2003) and New York State Emergency Management (Integrated
Publishing, 2009) mandate ICS’s use by all disciplines of local and state emergency response
groups.
Prior to 9/11 law enforcement generally did not face emergencies of such enormous
scale; police agencies seldom had to provide such extensive assistance to one another. Most
incidents were mitigated locally or required minor response from neighboring law enforcement
agencies (FEMA IS700a, 2009). Consequently, many law enforcement managers understandably
viewed their emergency response systems, often developed in isolation from one another, as
effective (Cardwell & Clooney, 2000). Since 9/11 emergency management has changed, law
enforcement has been thrown into the very forefront of the concept of the survival of America, as
was established during the 2001 terrorist attacks. Now, law enforcement agencies are joining
their fire department critical-incident management colleagues in implementing the ICS concepts.
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These changes started well before the 9/11 terrorist attacks. For instance, the 1984 Los
Angeles Olympics (Cardwell & Cooney, 2000) and subsequent major events that last beyond
one operational cycle (8-12 hours). Incidents are unplanned responses first responders must
manage while events are planned actions or training sessions well before incidents occur. Either
predicted or spontaneous, these responses forced cutting-edge law enforcement managers to seek
better ways to integrate not only allied police agencies but also other genres of agencies such as
fire and emergency medical services at the moment and place of any type of safety crisis or even
potential safety crisis, as in the Los Angeles Olympics case (Cardwell & Cooney, 2000). As
Cardwell and Cooney commented:
While an individual agency's protocols and procedures may have worked well for years in
a vacuum, the need for some standardization quickly becomes apparent when agencies
must integrate their resources rapidly during the response to a major incident. It is no
longer sufficient for an agency to develop and maintain a locally successful emergency
response plan; such plans also must be compatible with those of surrounding jurisdictions
and other disciplines, as well (p.1).
This necessary realization was present one hot day in Oakland, California in 1991. In a
few hours, the Tunnel Fire in the East Bay Hills destroyed 3,000 homes and took the lives of a
police officer, a firefighter, and 25 civilians (Cardwell & Clooney, 2000). Before 9/11 the
Tunnel Fire was one of the most critical-incidents that had required management resources from
both the fire and law enforcement disciplines to act in concert. The losses to all of the Oakland
responders and all of the assisting units were completely devastating. However, much more
terrible were the losses of life within the communities in the surrounding areas and in the
infrastructure. Cardwell and Clooney (2000) observed in their research that the development of a
cohesive management collaboration was literally hours behind the rapidly expanding fire zone
and the escalating damage.
Simply put, fire departments, law enforcement agencies, municipal water department
representatives, emergency medical services personnel, and other public safety agencies could
not implement and collaborate their efforts in time to noticeably limit the destruction of the fire
(Cardwell & Clooney, 2000). According to the authors,
The 1991 Oakland disaster was not just a fire problem. Law enforcement, public works
and utilities, the National Guard, health and safety services, and relief agencies
encountered crushing difficulties. None of these organizations shared a common
organizational system or compatible command structure. The Tunnel Fire pointed out the
17

need for a common emergency management system throughout local and state
government for use by all agencies with a first-responder role associated with public
safety (p.1).
Consequently, in 1993 California enacted legislation establishing the Standardized Emergency
Management System and mandating the use of FIRESCOPE (NIIMS) ICS for disaster
management (California Code, 2003).
The Oakland situation underscored the urgency of the need for national standardization.
As the rapid movement of large numbers of emergency response resources around the nation has
become more commonplace, a nationally standardized interdisciplinary emergency management
system has in turn become absolutely essential according to the United States Department of
Agriculture Fire Service (United States Department of Agriculture, 2002). The heightened
possibility that terrorists might any day use weapons of mass destruction on American soil has
made the necessity of quickly and efficiently integrating multidisciplinary resources and units
from local, state, and federal agencies unprecedented (Cardwell & Clooney, 2000). That is why
emergency planners across the country have to determine not only which system to use as the
standard but also how much deviation from that standard is acceptable by various agencies,
especially by local law enforcement departments and local critical-incident management groups
(Cardwell & Clooney, 2000). Without a doubt, law enforcement leaders must be able to change
any management procedure to adjust to local, operational, and political complications. However,
when any standard system changes significantly, it loses its value as a mechanism that could be
used to integrate dissimilar agencies with the least amount of confusion and uncertainty
(Cardwell & Clooney, 2000).
In 1999 individuals from various state and local emergency response communities wrote
the U.S. Attorney General concerning possible “command-and-control” conflicts that could arise
when various levels of government employed their own management style while training for a
hypothetical Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) exercise. The National Domestic
Preparedness Office (NDPO) was assigned to find a solution to this problem (Rohen, 2001).
Representatives from the Federal Emergency Management Administration (FEMA), the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the FEMA National Fire Academy and the NDPO were the
primary members of this task-force. The group’s findings were focused on coordination, incident
site operations, terminology, and training for the first responder community (Rohen, 2001). The
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group recommended and designed specific protocols that would function within existing state
and local response procedures allowing federal assets to function within local or state controlled
incidents. These new protocols were tested in previously scheduled multiagency response
exercises through FEMA’s National Fire Academy. Debriefings held after training indicated
federal responses and mandates could function within existing state and local ICS protocols
(Rohen, 2001).
The FBI established the FBI Joint-Operations-Center (FBI-JOC) to integrate and enhance
local or state government’s response to a terrorist incident (Rohen, 2001). To manage ongoing
incidents one must consider assets each has to offer. The problem of all responders integrating
into an existing crisis is difficult at best, Rohen (2001) focused on the need for all responders to
be knowledgeable of each agencies functions, strengths, responsibilities, and limitations to lessen
the amount of confusion between agencies responding to an event or incident.
Many agencies have made numerous modifications to the existing ICS model but have
retained the Incident Command System title. Truly, the organizational and operational reports of
some agencies implementing these modifications resemble the original FIRESCOPE model in
title alone (Center for Disease Control, 2004). Additionally, issues and conflicts during some
emergencies have demonstrated that fundamental ICS management concepts either were
completely absent or were functioning improperly. Therefore, in order to circumvent such
problems, agencies on the national, state, and local level should follow the basic Incident
Command System design and structure (NIMS Training, 2008). Typically, there exist eight basic
management concepts in the Incident Command System -- modular organization, unified
command, manageable span-of-control, common terminology, consolidated action plans,
comprehensive resource management, integrated communications, and predesignated incident
facilities (SARBC, 2003). Use of these basic principles in concert contributes to the success of
the Incident Command System.

Modular Organization
ICS divides organizational duties into five distinct areas: command, operations, planning,
logistics, and finance or administration, with each section subdivided to address various specific
tasks. This basic collaborative idea remains integral to ICS. Emergency response plans that do
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not incorporate this standardized five-part organization are not ICS, regardless of their titles
(Cardwell & Cooney, 2000).
The modular building blocks of ICS allow the organization to grow quickly as the
response to an incident grows and to shrink back down as the danger or emergency recedes.
Only needed components of the ICS organization are actually staffed, pursuant to the type and
scope of the incident. It is only an event like 9/11 that would see full staffing according to
Cardwell and other experts. Only in the largest and most complex field operations would the full
ICS organization and collaboration be fully staffed (Cardwell & Cooney, 2000).

Unified Command
Few large emergent incidents involve only one agency; most are multidisciplinary and
even multijurisdictional. The inherent ability for multiple agencies from multiple jurisdictions to
collaborate their work for the public good while keeping their autonomy, authority, and
jurisdiction represents one of the most important benefits of ICS (White, 2006).
According to Cardwell and Clooney (2000);
Under the unified command concept, each organization that has legal jurisdiction over a
significant portion of an incident can participate in the command structure. ICS provides
a separate interface for assisting or mutual-aid agencies that have no legal responsibility.
Therefore, representation in a unified command depends on the location of the incident
(whose turf is involved) and the nature of the incident (which disciplines are necessary to
resolve the problem) (p. 2).
Manageable Span-of-Control
Integral to the correct implementation of modular organization, this concept of
manageable span-of-control acts as a means to avoid overwhelming any one person with so
many duties and so much pressure that effectiveness slows (911 Dispatch, 2007). Current
established ICS guidelines for span-of-control range from 1:3 to 1:7, with 1:5 being the norm
(Cardwell & Cooney, 2000).
As the organization develops for any given emergent situation, managers must
continually expand the span-of-control by shared duties and assign additional personnel and staff
as needed to promulgate an efficiently supervised collaborative group. Similarly, as an incident
recedes, managers must consolidate responsibility and get rid of positions as they become
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redundant or flat-out obsolete, promptly demobilizing parts of the organization no longer
necessary (911 Dispatch, 2000).

Common Terminology
The ability to communicate effectively with one another is fundamental to any successful
collaborative project or response. The need to work with unfamiliar people and organizations
combined with the stress of an unexpected incident strains even the most effective
communication. ICS solves this problem by providing certain common definitions of
organizational functions, resources, and facilities. (Cardwell & Cooney, 2000) Similarly,
personnel must communicate in "clear text," by bypassing codes, acronyms, and other jargon not
comprehended by all concerned.

Consolidated Action Plans
Every incident requires some sort of an action plan. Needless to say, complex incidents
of long duration necessitate more elaborate planning. ICS hands down a formulaic planning
schema by which managers develop “laundry lists” of both tactical objectives and available
resources, prioritize the goals, and then assign resources to achieve each objective in order of its
established importance (Cardwell & Cooney, 2000).
When the available resources are depleted, managers must decide whether to order
additional resources or allow low-priority objectives to suffer. That is where consolidated action
planning enters the picture. Consolidated action planning considers not just the tactical
objectives but the logistical necessities of the ICS organization. In a single command, goals and
strategies enmeshed in the action plan should competently address the policies and priorities of
each agency sharing legal jurisdiction over the emergency. (Cardwell & Cooney, 2000)
In Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5 (HSPD-5, 2003), President Bush called on
the Secretary of Homeland Security to develop a national incident-management system to
provide a consistent nationwide approach for federal, state, tribal, and local governments to work
together to prepare for, prevent, respond to and recover from domestic incidents, regardless of
cause, size, or complexity. On March 1, 2004, after close collaboration with state and local
government officials and representatives from a wide range of public safety organizations,
Homeland Security issued the National Incident Management System (NIMS). It incorporates
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many existing best practices into a comprehensive national approach to domestic incident
management, applicable at all jurisdictional levels and across all functional disciplines.
The NIMS system represents a core set of doctrine, principles, terminology, and
organizational processes to enable effective, efficient, and collaborative incident management at
all levels. To provide the framework for interoperability and compatibility, the NIMS concept is
based on a balance between flexibility and standardization. The recommendations of the
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (the "9/11 Commission")
further highlight the importance of ICS. The Commission's recent report recommends national
adoption of the ICS to enhance command, control, and communications capabilities (HSPD-5,
2003).

Comprehensive Resource Management
Efficient resource management is perhaps the cornerstone of the ICS innovations.
Efficient resource management is achieved by implementing “standardized terms and definitions
(common terminology), using a mandatory initial check-in procedure, tracking the status of each
resource, and promptly reporting changes in resource status” (Cardwell & Cooney, 2000, p. 3).
The staff tracks the status of each resource after initial check-in and logs it as either
"assigned" (already assigned a task), "available" (ready and waiting for an assignment), or "out
of service" (not assigned and not available, such as a vehicle that needs repair or personnel who
must rest) (Cardwell & Cooney, 2000, p.3). Because time represents a huge frustration for
critical-incident workers, the chance to accurately assess what resources are at bay and put them
to use without significant delay constitutes a major benefit of ICS.
While many organizations may do this well, standardization of the process will facilitate
interagency coordination when an emergency arises, stated Cardwell and Cooney in their study
(2000).

Integrated Communications
Prior planning is more essential for integrated communications than for any other ICS
management idea. Coordination of frequency-sharing agreements, acquisition of compatible
radio hardware, and even installation of extra telephone lines and emergency power generators
represent just some of the bridges that agencies may have to cross to accomplish key inter- and
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intra-organizational communication during a critical-incident (Cardwell & Cooney, 2000). The
significance of responders using common terminology cannot be overstated. Multiple agencies
responding to a mass event must use clear, well defined language common to all. Joint Standard
Operation Procedures should be addressed and accepted prior to any incident (Cardwell &
Cooney, 2000).

Predesignated Incident Facilities
This final ICS management idea suggests identifying locations and facilities before
critical-incidents strike that will allow the myriad agencies to use for many of the standardized
ICS organizational functions. Common ICS terminology defines such incident facilities as an
incident command post, incident base, staging areas, helibases, and other locations (Cardwell &
Cooney, 2000). If needed, agencies must establish agreements to use convenient buildings, as
well as determine methods of contacting responsible parties, obtaining keys, and even
positioning supplies, prior to an actual critical-incident that needs to be managed.
The proper use of these eight ICS management concepts has assisted in the growth of
ICS (Emergency Management Program Concepts, 2005). Primarily because of its adoption by
the U.S. Forest Service, National Park Service, Bureau of Land Management, and U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service, ICS has proven successful during incidents as diverse as wildland fires, floods,
volcanic eruptions, earthquakes, hazardous materials incidents, multi-casualty accidents, the 9/11
terrorist attacks, and several airplane crashes such as the one that befell Queens right after the
terrorist attacks in 2001 (Terrorism Incident Annex, 2008). Agencies also have employed ICS
for the successful resolution of numerous planned events such as political conventions,
championship professional sports events, and visiting dignitaries (Incident Management Team,
2008).
The relationship that ICS management teams have with nonusers of ICS is also critical to
the structure’s success. As Cardwell and Cooney (2000) noted, the system retains its usefulness,
even when working with agencies that have not embraced ICS. Specifically, for example,
contingency plans for response to a terrorist incident in California include the immediate
assimilation of the ranking on-scene Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Agent into the
unified command process.
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Although the FBI represents the primary and managing federal agency during the crisis
phase of the response, local agencies still must respond effectively with local resources, likely
unassisted, for the first several critical hours. (United States Policy on Counterterrorism, 1995)
Nonetheless, agencies should immerse FBI supervisors in the unified command as early as
possible, primarily because of existing terrorism laws being United States Code violations. There
are many responders who believed the establishment of an FBI Joint Operations Center (JOC)
was designed to override existing local or state controlled incidents and take primary command
of the situation; however, this is not the case, the FBI is not in charge of lifesaving functions
associated with a major incident (Rohen, 2001). These functions must be managed mostly by
local resources with local personnel governed by local government. Any Weapons of Mass
Destruction (WMD) or terrorist incident will involve a multiagency response with authorities
from all agencies wondering “who’s in charge?’ Unity of command must be dealt with prior to
the incident occurring
Once the brunt of FBI manpower and resources begin to arrive and the FBI establishes a
command post (historically dividing the FBI's response into command, operations, and support
groups), the resulting collaboration with the local agencies’ incident command post would
include colocation and exchanging counterparts in absolutely critical management positions
(Blitzer, 1997).
In this manner, state and local departments would continue to assist in the situation while
accommodating the FBI's traditional command post and joint operations center structure
(Cardwell & Cooney, 2000). Agencies from various jurisdictions should continue to seek to
develop similar arrangements with other federal agencies that do not yet use ICS, such as the
National Transportation Safety Board during the response to transportation accidents.
As noted earlier, 9/11 has changed everything, especially with regard to the ICS
management of critical-incidents System (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2000). Terrorist
attacks, transportation accidents, natural disasters, and political and sporting events bring unseen
burdens to public safety agencies, today more than ever in America’s history. As a result, these
incidents can cause agencies to flounder or succeed based on the amount of preparedness and
cooperation among the various entities called upon to deal with such pressing and often
unpredictable crises.
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For over 30 years many emergency response agencies – federal, state, and local -- have
turned to the Incident Command System to assist them in establishing a cooperative effort that
can process critical situations (Cardwell & Cooney, 2000). However, some agencies in various
jurisdictions have discovered that the systems they developed did not match those created by
allied agencies, even though the systems originated from the same ICS concept with the same
goals of integration in mind (USDOT-RITA, 2007).
Cardwell and Cooney (2000) identified the challenges of ICS best:
With the need for the ability to integrate multidisciplinary resources from local, state, and
federal agencies increasing, emergency response planners must consider using a standard
system and encouraging as little deviation from that standard as possible. While local
agencies must have the ability to modify the system to meet their individual needs, they
also must understand the importance of minimizing these changes to ensure compatibility
with other organizations. Agencies must work together to ensure that their ability to
successfully integrate their emergency response systems remains as certain as their
commitment to the safety of the American public and their personnel who must face the
dangers of a sudden threat (p. 5).
In the wake of 9/11, the need to better integrate critical-incident response mechanisms
has become even greater. We have seen that with the collapsing of all intelligence organizations
under one terrorism czar (Office of Director of National Intelligence, 2008).
The ICS systems are also finding their way to law enforcement collaborations, without the
necessary involvement of the fire departments. In the years that followed 9/11, ICS remained
primarily the forte of fire services. Recently, however, law enforcement officials across the
country have come to appreciate the value of a coordinated response to emergencies (IS-100.LE,
2008).
There are innumerable benefits to the law enforcement wing of critical-incident
management’s adoption of ICS as the collaborative vehicle of choice. Vehicle collisions,
pursuits, officer-involved shootings, terrorism, natural disasters, and civil disturbances represent
only a few of the incidents for which an agency or department can use ICS. Whether they require
the response of one agency or many, critical-incidents become more manageable with ICS
(Conner, 1997).
Under those circumstances involving multiple jurisdictions, ICS allows agencies to
provide a singular response, as this review of literature has examined. As a planning tool, and in
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the context of cross-training, ICS designates in advance the specific responsibilities of all agency
personnel. More critically, ICS sets forth who will be in charge at the scene (Conner, 1997).
In a Heritage Foundation report (2005) military researchers criticize the ICS agencies for
refusing to delegate a leader, when in reality; the ICS accomplishes just that (Kochems, 2005).
The public expects and deserves cooperation between agencies on the scene of an
emergency, without jurisdictional disputes. Formalized agreements--whether between in-house
participants or among other agencies--set the stage for integrated communication, centralized
staging of resources, and the comprehensive management of those resources once deployed
(Conner, 1997).
ICS also eliminates 10 codes, which usually vary from agency to agency and can snarl
interagency communication, as mentioned earlier in this literature review. Instead, agencies use
common terms that laypersons can understand to promote understanding and improve response
times for all involved agencies (Cardwell & Clooney, 2000). Finally, ICS provides a manageable
bridge of control for the incident commander on the scene, who can provide overall scene
management rather than become slowed by tasks better delegated to subordinates (NIMSIncident Command System, 2005).
According to Conner (1997) ICS has simplified the management of critical-incidents by
organizing the response into various modules or subgroups. Anyone in the agency, from the
chief to the patrol officer, can implement ICS into its full configuration. The individual who
initiates the ICS response usually assumes command on the scene, at the emergency command
center, or at the field command post and becomes the incident commander. Unless formally
relieved, the incident commander remains in charge and provides a single point of contact for the
duration of the operational period;
The incident commander oversees the entire operation through sectors, or branches,
which provide a manageable span of control. Sectors can be collapsed, expanded, or
added as needed during a specific incident. Others may not be needed at all for an
emergency limited in scope or duration (Conner, 1997, p.1).
For instance, ICS departments often are designated as being logistics, operations,
individual personnel, and intelligence. ICS deployment during a large-scale vehicle crash, for
instance, would not necessitate the help of the intelligence sector. The intelligence sector, for
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obvious reasons, would only be invoked during terrorism or other related critical-incidents
(Bureau of Justice Assistance, 2005).
However, other sectors such as traffic control, hazardous materials cleanup, or media
liaison will surely play roles in a major traffic accident. Personnel officers would help on-site or
follow up later at the hospital. Operations staff would collaborate on equipment needs, such as
ambulances, tow trucks, police cars, and fire department resources (Conner, 1997).
Sector leaders’ main capacities are to keep the incident commander apprised of their
sectors' actions and – more importantly -- requirements, allowing the incident commander more
leeway to match resources to existing conditions or predict future necessities. Various checklists
make sure that sector leaders finish critical tasks during the incident. In light of the immense
demands relegated to personnel at the scene of the incident, sector leaders could - without a
second glance - overlook a possible resource or legal or departmental requirement (Conner,
1997). That is why such tight coordination between section leaders and the incident commander
is absolutely essential in navigating a crisis scene to a stasis.
Of course, the myriad sectors or component parts within sectors usually vary from
department to department, agency to agency, and jurisdiction to jurisdiction. More critical than
the number and genre and variety of sectors is the capability of the agency to respond to various
critical-incidents under a dedicated number of plans that may include allied agencies (Bureau of
Justice Assistance, 2005). The law enforcement wings’ adoption of the ICS, then, is highly
desirable and has already resulted in much positive change. Now, with the collaboration of law
enforcement and fire and rescue, with the assistance of the military – as described later in this
literature review – the public is truly better served today by ICS than it was years ago and years
before that by no system of integration at all. That said, ICS has a long way to go to gain the
efficiency and the results that its supporters desire (Cotter, 2007).

The Federal Response

There exist two quotes from government officials following the 1979 nuclear power plant
disaster at Three Mile Island that best set the tone for agency collaboration in the event of a
terrorist attack: First, "I've learned that emergencies can only be managed by people at the site,
they can't be managed back in Washington" (Carlson, 1999, ¶ 1). And second;
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Expect the unexpected and be prepared to adjust accordingly. The importance of limiting
those things that any executive should attempt to do in the time allowed, and the
importance of carefully choosing one's battles, is implicit in the fact that some of the
toughest of those battles will be chosen for you (Carlson, 1999, ¶ 2).
These two quotes could also apply to other incidents including terrorist attacks, the
potential of which have darkened the United States’ existence for the past several years. The
International Association of Chiefs of Police labels an actual disaster as an incident that threatens
to or actually takes lives, causes substantial risk to property or the well-being of the community
or a segment of that community, or requires a commitment of resources beyond those normally
available (Carlson, 1999).
Carlson (1999) also noted;
Such incidents may become more frequent and deadly as criminals and terrorist groups
exploit the availability of chemical substances, biological agents, and nuclear materials to
construct weapons of mass destruction. Reasons for accessibility include the increased
volume and types of substances produced, the failure of security systems to protect the
materials, the transfer of prohibited weapons to irresponsible governments or the
proliferation of various materials to countries that previously did not perceive a need for
sophisticated weaponry (¶ 4).
As outlined in this literature review, essentially two ways exist to manage a crisis. One
way means ignoring the necessity to set forth a particular command structure before a crisis
occurs and then being forced to invent such a structure during the actual incident’s tenure. This
route means that onsite command or management personalities must create a working incident
structure while simultaneously trying to manage the developing crisis (Carlson, 1999).
The second option means defining the incident command, coordination, communication, and
operational direction. The unified command and control of the emergency, the creation of
strategic and tactical goals, and the integration of resources and individuals from all responding
agencies determine the efficacy and efficiency of the total government response to the crisis
(Carlson, 1999).
Accordingly, the most important question for incident management professionals and
administrative staff is how they can direct resources from many agencies of different disciplines
at all levels of government in a helpful, efficient, and coordinated way to address a potential
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technical disaster and maintain the faith, respect, in some cases obedience, and in all situations
pure confidence of the citizens who may become the victims (Carlson, 1999).
Simultaneously, these professionals have to deal with additional crisis management
difficulties including changing management objectives, differing value systems, political
harassment, too little data, too much data, poor data-handling methods, little planning,
insufficient time to learn, and confusion (Carlson, 1999).
According to Carlson;
The ICS requires planning and practice on the part of the participating agencies.
Unfortunately, it is impossible for the various emergency response agencies at all levels
of government to develop and practice plans with one another to address the uncountable
scenarios in the thousands of different venues across the United States. However, an
application of ICS to accommodate different levels of response represents an alternative
to this maze of potential pairings of responding agencies. Through a well-developed ICS,
state and local governments can alert their state, local and county response agencies and
deploy them under the predefined ICS, thus ensuring that a unified command and
response team immediately begins to address the crisis and its consequences (p. 2).
Creating a Joint Operations Center (JOC) is another tactic. In response to a domestic
misuse of weapons of mass destruction incident, a presidential directive designates the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) as the lead agency of all federal resources, as mentioned earlier in
this review of literature. To facilitate this responsibility, the FBI employs a joint operations
center (FBI JOC Management, 2008), which in turn employs many of the concepts critical to the
state-level ICS. This center coordinates interagency operational and support requirements of any
joint deployment and manages joint agency public information and media interaction and
generally oversees all matters pertaining to the incident (Carlson, 1999).
The federal agencies that work in such incidents have worked with the FBI in exercises
and drills based on the Joint Operations Command (JOC) concept. Commanders and managers
from the various responding federal and state agencies converge as a joint operations command
coalition to address critical decisions regarding incident management and amelioration (Carlson,
1999).
As for the actual high-level leadership, the FBI designates a Special Agent-in-Charge
(SAC) to convene and head the on-site command group (FBI JOC Management, 2008).
According to Carlson and FBI briefings, the SAC may recommend technical and scientific
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moves with potential catastrophic consequences to higher federal authority as required by
training and specific manuals and guidelines (FBI JOC Management, 2008).
The SAC also keeps a direct line of communication open with the FBI director and with
the attorney general as well. As a result, the important interfacing and collaboration of state and
local operations with federal operations, and vice versa, occur through the various manifestations
of the JOC. An efficient working relationship between all levels of government in this type of
incident management is not an option; it is absolutely essential (FBI JOC Management, 2008).
The key question remains, especially in light of the magnitude and effect of any potential
terrorist assault: How does the JOC interface with the state and local ICS? First, unification of
command and combination of operations is essential. As Carlson (1999) stated;
Specialized federal technical and scientific resources can rely on the FBI, including its
personnel with whom they have practiced, for a single format of decision making that
remains the same no matter which community hosts the incident. The local FBI office
where the incident occurs holds the key to managing deployed federal personnel and
resources and organizing the JOC. Already familiar with state and local resources, these
FBI offices must become acquainted with the ICS response plans for those states or
communities within their regions. This melding of command and control resources builds
a bridge between the federal JOC and the state ICS (p. 3).
Also, the task of starting familiarization meetings and training camps at all government
levels for terrorist incident management lies equally on state and federal officials in the various
regions. The delegated incident commanders of the state or local ICS and the SAC of the JOC
must work together through exercises and drills prior to a real test of their capabilities. The
success of combining federal technical and scientific assets, which are completely foreign to
local and state responders for so many reasons, with state and local personnel and assets will
transpire only through the competent management skills of the state ICS incident commanders
together with the SAC (Carlson, 1999).
For instance, the management of the Oklahoma City bombing demonstrates how the
meaningful use of multiagency assets succeeded because of planning, preparation, and joint
alliances. The former Oklahoma City chief of police acknowledged the importance of
establishing great working relationships with federal authorities and the local fire chief before a
crisis because of the near impossibility of doing so once a crisis – particularly a terrorist attack –
starts (Carlson, 1999).
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The federal and local response can actually transform into a combined incident command
at the time of a terrorist crisis only with cooperation and preplanning on a local level between
state ICS and FBI commanders (FBI JOC Management, 2008, ¶ 7). In fact, predetermination of
roles and duties, crisis training and exercising of personnel, and a desire to prepare for the
unfathomable will permit this melding of FBI and incident-crisis-management resources. A
federal report emphasizes this point in two statements: "Unified command...is essential...to avoid
chaos and coordinate tactical activities" and "[t]he issue of who is the primary agency in charge
is not to be determined on the emergency scene" (Recommendations for Organizations and
Operations During Civil Disturbance, 1994, p. 56).
Basically, preparation for managing a weapon of mass destruction disaster primarily
requires an understanding of the magnitude of the potential ramifications. When all involved
responding agencies, departments, and jurisdictions have that huge potential outcome in full
focus, they will comprehend the truly essential elements of planning, training, cooperation,
liaison, resource definition, and coherent public policy implementation (Carlson, 1999).
As a result, incident managers cannot wait for such an incident to occur to invent a process for
tackling the next one. As Carlson (1999, p.3) noted, “They must manage the first event
intelligently and with a meaningful application of resources and leadership at all levels of
government”.
In 2000 the Federal government mandated a single, no-advance, no-notice exercise that
was planned and implemented by the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) in May of 2000 (USDHS, 2009). The goal of TOPOFF was to
test the ability of federal, state, and local governments to respond to and mitigate a major
terrorist attack. This test involved more than 6,500 individuals from all levels of government
responding to a simulated biological attack in Denver, Colorado and a simulated chemical attack
in Portsmouth, New Hampshire (USDHS, 2009). In 2003, a second exercise, TOPOFF2, was
completed with advance notice to 8,500 federal, state, and local participants (USDHS, 2009).
This was the first national exercise following the September 11, 2001, attack and was
coordinated by the Department of Homeland Security (USDHS, 2009). TOPOFF 2 targeted two
major cities Chicago, which was tasked with a biological attack, and Seattle, which was assigned
a simulated radiological dispersal device (RDD) (USDHS, 2009). TOPOFF 3 was conducted in
April, 2005. This exercise was significant in that this was the first national test using the all
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encompassing National Response Plan (NRP) (USDHS, 2009). TOPOFF 3 also included
representatives from the private sector as well allied foreign governments. TOPOFF 3 focused
on a simulated chemical attack in New London, Connecticut and a simulated biological attack in
New Jersey (USDHS, 2009). TOPOFF 3 involved over 10,000 participants and focused on
terrorism prevention, risk communication, and public information venues as well as long-term
recovery and remediation issues (USDHS, 2009). The final national exercise that focused on
response and recovery was TOPOFF 4. This exercise was conducted in Portland, Oregon;
Phoenix, Arizona; the U.S. territory of Guam, as well as Washington, D.C. TOPOFF 4 included
an increased emphasis on prevention, long-term recovery and remediation issues,
communications and coordination with international allies (USDHS, 2009). More than 15,000
participants were included in TOPOFF 4 and involved the governments of Australia, Canada,
and the United Kingdom. All targets were subjected to a simulated radiological attack (USDHS,
2009).

ICS: A Military Critique

Throughout American history, the military has drawn many of its best practices and ideas
from law enforcement, and vice versa. As a result, an examination of the military’s collaborative
practices will shed light on this study’s analysis on collaboration and cross-training from a
critical-incident management perspective (Banner, 2004).
Perhaps even more critically, local and state law enforcement officials are often in
positions wherein they need to collaborate directly with the military in order to reach their goals.
Banner (2004) put it best:
Recent events in U.S. history and ongoing planning have indicated that increasingly our
military must be prepared to work with various domestic civilian agencies. But how is
this done and how do we integrate operations when this happens? It is not as simple as
many people may believe. Any assumption that we can easily get along because we are
"all Americans" is wrong. Organizationally and functionally, the U.S. Department of
Defense has much more in common with allied and most often even enemy military
organizations than with local civilian governments in the United States. Integrating
operations is therefore something that needs planning and study if it is going to work
(p.1).
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Banner (2004) reported that the military had made progress in the last few years in
improving joint and combined operations-working with all U.S. public services and working
with the military forces from other nations. There are, unfortunately, no equivalent systems
within U.S. civilian agencies.
Because the military will normally be authorized to function in a support role during a
domestic incident, providing assistance that only the military can bring, it is the Department of
Defense’s responsibility to go the extra mile in learning about the civilian systems it might
encounter. To do this, the armed forces need to become familiar with the systems and
idiosyncrasies of the civilian world and conform to their modes of operation and also their
various method of integrating among their own agencies (Banner, 2004).
Banner (2004) stated:
As a starting point, it is critical for the military to understand the civilian approach to
organizational management and how ICS fits into the civilian world. To be blunt, there is
no common doctrine or hardly anything that would be recognized as such for day-to-day
operations (¶ 3).
From the military’s perspective, leadership and management are unique to each
institution and official (Banner, 2004). Every civilian organization such as police, fire or rescue,
from the local up through the federal level, is organized and led differently. Going back to the
colonial period, each developed independently and followed an independent course (Banner,
2004). Even the military analysts admit that in many ways that is part of the strength of the
United States, and the federal system and local home rule are valuable products of a democratic
society.
For all the benefits of local control, the disadvantage for emergency operations is most
definitely that there is no commonality in the military’s view (Banner, 2004, p.1). Local
governments make modifications at their own paces and there exists no standardized operational
structure across local boundaries let along state lines (Banner, 2004, p.1). That is part of the
reason that ICS has gained such dominance according to the military studies -- because there was
the recognition that some form of doctrine and system was needed for emergency operations
when assets from multiple jurisdictions needed to cooperate and work more efficiently. It was
also an admission that the systems in existence for managing day-to-day operations were
insufficient for critical-incident management.
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Indeed, the military skepticism regarding ICS does not end there, Banner (2004) stated;
Having said that civilian government has embraced ICS and that most public officials
have at least heard the acronym, very few of them understand it or how it works; their
focus is on day-to-day operations and the challenges of their routine activities (those
challenges for which they were elected and will be reelected). A strength of the military
structure is leaders are trained and promoted through the system they will use for live
operations, thereby getting an understanding of subordinate roles and functions. The
civilian world is hit-or-miss; elected leaders frankly have no requirement to know
anything about the nuts and bolts of specific governmental functions, emergency
management included (p.1).
In most circumstances, ICS is a system just for emergencies in the military’s viewpoint
(Banner, 2004). However, the system is much more than that: Any collaborative system,
especially something as flexible as ICS, provides opportunities for cross-training and the
improvement of each individual agency within the collaboration, event, or incident. But, the fact
remains that the military sees no function for the ICS outside of emergent situations. As such, in
their view, hardly anyone uses ICS routinely. The military’s analysis exempts the fire
departments from this appraisal, as Banner (2004) stated:
The fire services are probably the one outstanding exception, because they do emergency
operations all the time; thus another challenge, a weakness in the system and an issue for
military integration, is that ICS is generally not a standing system. Civilian agencies will
be making the transition to this system while they are in the middle of an emergency.
That is a clear drawback and something that plagues most emergency operations (p. 1).
Banner (2004) remarked that the implementation of ICS certainly had not solved many of
the problems of civilian government according to the military analysts. The best it had done was
to offer the hope of a better method to organize and operate (p. 2) . Some locations with
particularly inspired leadership or a strong emergency management system may function
tolerably according to the military, but many organizations will end up floundering during an
emergency because they are trying to learn a new system and reorganize in the middle of the
emergency at the same time (Banner, 2004). That said, the Department of Defense acknowledges
that however inferior it views the ICS to be, it must link up with it during emergencies so it must
learn to deal with what terms idiosyncrasies and imperfections (Banner, 2004).
For the applications of this review of literature and the goals of this paper, the military
criticism of ICS is valuable from the standpoint that it generates practical ways in which the ICS
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can improve or at least be adapted to a planned foreseeable emergency that will be discussed in
further length in the Data Analysis section and then in the Summary, Conclusions, and
Recommendations section as well. In brief, the ICS can stand to learn from the military’s
insistence on anticipating every contingency before an emergency. The military’s training also
is closer to the reality of an emergency than law enforcement’s or critical-incident management’s
in general. However, as civilian organizations the ICS agencies cannot expect to be run as a
command unit – nor should they. Their leadership and goals are different, but without changing
those fundamentals, it is possible to learn from the military’s experience and critique of ICS and
the civilian critical-incident management and law enforcement agencies’ work during
emergencies such as the existing Federal Response Plan (FRP).
The Federal Response Plan outlines the individual state’s responsibility in the event of an
emergency. Under the federal plan the state has complete autonomy under most identified
incidents. The state even has the authority to direct federal assets to a certain extent. Under the
Stafford Act the state should design and implement an Emergency Operations Plan (EOP). All
EOPs should have the following elements (FEMA-SLG, 1996, p. 4-1):

1. Introductory Material, certain items that enhance accountability and ease of use.
2. Purpose of the Plan, a general statement of what the EOP is meant to do.
3. Situation and Assumptions, this narrows the scope of the EOP by identifying what
hazards the EOP addresses, what jurisdictional issues which may affect the response,
and finally what assumptions are being presumed rather than facts.
4. Concept of Operations, this section explains the entities overall approach to an
incident, what should happen, when, and who is in charge.
5. Organization and Assignment of Responsibilities, this section establishes the
emergency organization that will be relied on to respond to an emergency situation.
6. Administration and Logistics, this section covers general support requirements and
the availability of services and support for all types of emergencies.
7. Plan Development and Maintenance, the overall approach to planning, including the
assignment of planning responsibilities.
8. Authorities and References, this section refers to the legal basis for operations and
activities.
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The Emergency Operations Plan should address many operational functions. Such
functions as direction and control, warning, emergency public information, and evacuation
actions must be factored in the earliest stages of an incident (FEMA-SLG, 1996). All of these
operational functions are outside the federal response mission and should not be considered for
implementation into a Federal Response Plan. It is for the state to choose functions and actions
that will be the “best fit” or “best practices” into daily operations, policies, governmental
structure, and resources. Every state EOP should identify and be prepared to mitigate any type of
disaster. This approach is termed “all hazards” planning. The state is directly responsible for the
safety and security of all its citizens and the protection of key infrastructure and support
facilities. A state may choose to delegate some responsibilities to local jurisdictions to ensure
continuation of operations within the local counties, cities and towns (FEMA-SLG, 1996).
Specific elements of a state EOP plan would be to identify departments and agencies that
have been tasked to perform response and recovery and lists those activities the entities will or
should accomplish (FEMA-SLG, 1996). The EOP should outline the assistance that could be
provided to local jurisdictions during disasters that local agency emergency response and
recovery asset capabilities could not accomplish (FEMA-SLG, 1996). The Emergency
Operations Plan will specify the communications procedures and systems the state will use to
alert, notify, recall, and dispatch responders and communicate with other states or elements
within the federal government (FEMA-SLG, 1996). Additionally, the plan sets forth
requirements that will be taken to make initial situation assessment from the local jurisdiction(s)
that have been directly impacted by the disaster. Typically, this information provides an early
assessment of the damage or extent of the incident (FEMA-SLG, 1996, p.7-6):
1. The approximate number of disaster victims that have been:
− Injured, killed, or are missing.
− Evacuated from the area impacted by the disaster.
− Housed in mass care facilities.
2. The damage done to lifeline systems such as hospitals, power plants, water and
sanitation systems, etc.
3. The damage done to transportation networks such as airports, major roads and
bridges, rail lines, ports, etc.
4. The types of assistance (food, water, medical, etc.) the jurisdiction will require to
satisfy the immediate needs of disaster victims.
The plan also has instructions for the legal formation of Regional/State Memorandums of
Understanding (MOU). The MOU describes the assistance criteria and scope or amount of assets
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that have been dedicated to ensure joint federal-state operations during large-scale disasters. The
following list identifies some of the typical responsibilities contained in the MOUs that may be
addressed in the state EOP (FEMA-SLG, 1996, p.7-6):
1. Provisions for notifying the FEMA Regional Office about the occurrence of a disaster
or evolving emergency situation that may warrant activation of the Regional
Response Plan (RRP).
2. Communication protocols to include means of communication, frequency of contact,
and message content (e.g. warning messages, situation reports, requests for
assistance, etc.).
3. Provisions for requesting Federal Response Teams (FRT) to assist the State.
a. Requesting that a Firefighter Assist and Search Team (FAST) be deployed to
assist the State in assessing the disaster situation.
b. Designating individuals to participate as State Emergency Management Agency
representatives on the FAST teams.
c. Preparing a joint (FEMA/State) Preliminary Damage Assessment (PDA).
d. Provisions for providing work space and communication support to the Regional
liaison officers and other Federal teams deployed to the State EOC, staging areas,
or the area directly impacted by the disaster.
e. Provisions for designating a State Coordinating Officer (SCO) to work directly
with the Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO).
f. Provisions for assisting the FCO in identifying candidate locations for
establishing the Disaster Field Office (DFO).
The EOP outlines how interstate Memorandums of Understanding (agreements between
neighboring states) should be activated and maintained throughout the incident (FEMA-SLG,
1996, p.7-7).
In 2002 President George W. Bush signed into law the Homeland Security Act requiring
all local and state governments in the United States to become compliant with the Federal
Response Plan. This broad mandate was specifically established for the 88,000 state and local
governments (GASB, 2009) throughout the county. The theory of applying “Best Practices” in
relying on how each branch of government integrates actions and policy is left up to local and
state politicians and planners. The responsibilities of state politicians in incident management
should be clear. Governors’ of each state have the final responsibility for the “safety and wellbeing” of the state’s population (USHHS, 2009). Each governor may temporarily suspend state
laws or regulations that will interfere with the programmed or logical response (USHHS, 2009).
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The Arizona Example

One logical method to study ICS in action is to examine exactly how one state
implements the system. The Arizona Department of Public Safety (ADPS) uses ICS daily under
many different circumstances. Three particular levels of response announce what resources and
how many of each resource to commit to each incident; Level I incidents require that one or two
officers resolve minor traffic accidents, make arrests, or perhaps conduct light crowd control
(Conner, 1997). Level II incidents in Arizona’s interpretation and implementation of ICS require
the assistance of three or more officers and obviously signify events of greater magnitude
(Conner, 1997). Incidents usually involve several types of agencies and may cross jurisdictional
boundaries. Examples include collisions that results in road closures or evacuations. Level III
incidents involve three or more officers from multiple shifts, require support from other bureaus,
districts, or agencies, and mandate a significant response to contain, control, and recover from
the critical-incident (Conner,1997). Without a doubt, Level III incidents receive the most
training focus today as terrorism is on the forefront of everyone’s worries and attention and
funding dollars are available through Department of Homeland Security grants and other
vehicles (Conner,1997).
Situations classified as Level II or III require the use of an incident report log by the
sector leaders and incident manager (Conner, 1997). By keeping accurate records the Arizona
Department of Public Safety can monitor their own responses and the responses of allied
agencies to improve upon their performance for critical-incidents yet to occur. The log also
provides documentation that might be needed later in court in the event of litigation, which in the
case of traffic accidents is highly likely (Conner, 1997). The Arizona Department of Public
Safety has developed an ICS manual to deal with the multiple types of emergency issues that
occur every year (Conner, 1997). Arizona created this manual to be user-friendly to officers on
an active scene. The manual includes information officers find useful in managing criticalincidents as they occur.
Conner (1997) stressed that the ICS manual should deal with statutes that articulate legal
precedents and remove impediments to the agency's response (¶ 22). As an example, agencies
can call the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and request that all unnecessary aircraft be
turned away from the scene of a critical-incident. For this reason, the ICS manual contains a
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copy of the applicable statute as well as the protocol for enlisting the FAA's assistance (Conner,
1997).
Conner (1997) provided an example of a critical-incident where the manual came in very
handy:
An actual event emphasizes the need to address such contingencies. During a recent
incident in Los Angeles, media helicopters interfered with the apprehension of armed
bank robbers and drew their fire, worsening an already-hazardous situation. By
incorporating lessons learned from past incidents, agencies can develop comprehensive
manuals to guide them through future emergencies (¶ 22).
In addition to the ICS manual, Conner (1997) suggested using a separate guide known as
a “standing plan” that sets forth the appropriate response to events or civil emergencies that the
agency sees less frequently or can prepare for in advance (¶ 22). Examples of uses for the
“standing plan” include crowd control at large concerts, sporting events, and civil
demonstrations. It is controversial as to whether terrorist attacks should have grounding the
“standing plan” (¶ 22). Proponents feel that there should be standing procedures in place; critics
are afraid that the procedures will act as impediments to constitutional protections in place to
prevent any semblance of a police state (Conner, 1997).
As for direct training, the Arizona Department of Public Safety’s comprehensive training
program begins at its training academy with a 4-hour straight set of instruction. Desk exercises
test collaboration candidates' knowledge of ICS procedures via the manual and illustrate how
they might perform during an emergency (Conner, 1997).
A more reliable indicator of performance comes later; however, both announced and
surprise disaster drills test the readiness and response capabilities of DPS employees and
those from other agencies. Ironically, just 3 weeks before the bus crash, Phoenix public
safety employees--including police, fire, and emergency medical services personnel-staged a simulated bus collision to test their preparedness. This training greatly enhanced
the agencies' response capabilities when the real crash occurred (¶ 24).
Civilian employees who because of their position within an agency become integrated
with emergency response should not be bypassed for training under the Arizona procedures.
Dispatchers, crime scene technicians, and logistical support employees are important
components of the total ICS response. They also should participate in drills to ensure their ability
to handle emergencies (Conner, 1997).
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Administrators who need additional assistance with training or any other aspect of ICS
should rely on other agencies for guidance such as most state police and large municipal
departments that use some form of ICS (Conner, 1997). Other potential sources for information
and expert training include local fire departments, the National Fire Academy, state emergency
management agencies, and, perhaps most critically for terrorist incidents, the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (Conner, 1997).
The Arizona example provided evidence that the Incident Command System is a simple
yet effective way of training for and helping to mitigate critical-incidents. The ICS promotes a
collaborative answer to critical-incidents with appropriate resources by structuring a central
command of communication, actual incident command, and of course, on-site control (Conner,
1997). Periodic disaster training prepares emergency responders in advance, and this at least
partly answers the military criticism. Careful mandated recordkeeping forces investigations to
stay on track and provides an efficacious manner to actually evaluate agencies' real response.
Incident Command Systems allow agencies to handle emergencies quickly and confidently
(Conner, 1997).
Of course, this is not to say that there is no way for ICS systems to improve. As
mentioned above, Arizona is one of the states with the best and longest record of dealing with
ICS collaboration, and its level of proficiency both in training and in practices is more the
exception rather than the rule (Arizona Emergency Management Commission, 2008). That said,
ICS still provides an excellent framework that can be expanded – and history has shown that
incident managers and state legislators will expand it when needed – to better suit an incident or
the changing times.
Coordination in Highway Emergencies

Examination of law enforcement’s and critical-incident management’s collaborative
efforts in highway emergencies is valuable because that is the area in which national, state, and
local agencies have the most experience today; and that experience can be extrapolated, when
successful, to dealing with larger scale issues such as weapons of mass destruction and terrorism
(USDOT-RITA, 2007). Highway incidents, of course, fluctuate in type and scale -- from lifethreatening disasters such as a multi-car-and-truck pileup or even a hazardous material (hazmat)
spill on an interstate highway to a much more minor no-injury, one-car crash into a yield sign on
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a small street (USDOT-RITA, 2007). Because more than 50 % of the situations involving traffic
jams are generated by incident-related delays, highway agencies own a major stake in the
efficient management of roadway incident scenes to restore normal traffic flow as quickly as
safety allows (Allred, 2004).
However, according to Allred (2004):
Highway agencies typically have no direct control over how quickly a roadway is cleared
after an incident because emergency scenes are controlled by the first-response agencies
that have statutory jurisdiction (fire, emergency medical services, and law enforcement).
Highway agencies usually are considered "second responders," with a mission to clear
the roadway and restore traffic flow after the first responders have addressed the primary
mission of protecting public safety and health. In practice, first and second responders
usually cooperate to recover normal traffic flow as quickly as possible. But what happens
when a crash blocks the roadway longer than necessary, and highway agencies have no
influence on decisions about how to manage the incident (¶ 2).
The Model Procedures Guide for Highway Incidents, a draft document developed by the
National Fire Service Incident Management System Consortium, demonstrates how an ICS used
for many years by the fire departments and emergency management agencies can be extrapolated
to various types of highway incidents. Funded by the U.S. Department of Transportation's
(USDOT) Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS) Public Safety Program, the Model
Procedures Guide (MPG) adapts the consortium's ICS to highway incident operations (Allred,
2004). The guide provides concrete and real-life examples of command structures for a wide
variety of highway incident scenarios -- from terrorist events to winter storms, parades, hazmat
spills, and typical motor vehicle crashes. The idea is to perform the thinking and the testing
beforehand, so when an incident occurs all that remains is the actual execution with very little
on-the-ground analysis.
The MPG guide takes into account that traffic flow continuance is an important and
worthwhile end. Allred (2004) stated the Model Procedures Guide for Highway Incidents
addresses the need to balance the safety of motorists, responders, and victims with the need to
restore traffic flow and the Model Procedures Committee asks incident commanders to consider
the following motivating points when managing a highway incident:
* Provide emergency services and remove the traffic blockage as quickly as possible
* Protect responders (and those in their care) from being struck by moving vehicles
* Protect motorists, passengers, and cargo from the hazards of the incident
* Facilitate the movement of emergency response vehicles
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* Facilitate traffic flow past the incident and throughout the region, as necessary and
when possible (¶ 6).
As Allred (2004) demonstrated, highway agencies are able to garner an excess of benefits
from striving with other allied response agencies to adopt common yardsticks for managing
highway incidents. Needless to say, written guidelines are critical. They provide a standardized,
predictable tack and may be applied routinely until perfection is achieved or a better method is
discovered. Written guidelines also provide a training tool for responders, offer a baseline for
critiques and reviews of incidents, and make the commander's operations more effective. In sum,
written guidelines either can reflect strict policies or allow flexibility in managing incidents
(Allred, 2004).
But scenario-based guidelines are also incredibly useful. The Model Procedures Guide
for Highway Incidents contains a series of scenarios, with a specific instance for each scenario of
a complete, systematic organizational structure based on the ICS. The structure is created to give
the major functions of command, operations, planning, logistics, and finance and administration
experience in functioning and practice (Allred, 2004). Local agencies decide themselves how to
individually provide staffing for these standardized tasks based on the outlined scenarios.
The committee designed this ICS for use during all genres and magnitudes of highway
incidents, from routine mechanical breakdowns and crashes to severe weather and terrorist
events. The ICS allows the organizational structure to expand and contract – as mentioned earlier
in this literature review – as dictated by the severity and circumstances of the incident,
permitting a smooth transition between single-unit responses and large multi-agency operations,
the equivalent of Level III in the Arizona system (Allred, 2004).
Allred (2004) found that:
The IMS builds the organization from the ground up, adding functional units for new
activities. The incident is partitioned into manageable tasks, and the best-qualified
response resources are assigned to each need. As the incident grows in complexity, the
system maintains a safe span of control and ensures that all activity is conducted under a
single chain of command. The IMS ensures the safety of responders, crash victims, and
motorists, while responders mitigate the impact of the incident on traffic flow and the
surrounding community (¶ 10).
Allred (2004) also stated the ICS model could move beyond traditional first responders to
target support functions as well:
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The concepts in the guide were proven effective by emergency service crews, who also
fine-tuned the IMS in the field over nearly 30 years, and the American National
Standards Institute codified IMS as National Fire Protection Association Standard 1561.
Nonemergency responders--such as transportation, public works, and public health
agencies--also can be incorporated into the IMS organization. The terminology used in
the guide was chosen carefully to convey a uniform message to users from all response
professions and for all levels of Government (¶ 11).
In addition, the ICS acknowledges that all highway incidents are controlled under and
come under the auspices of the authority of the agencies that have actual, real statutory
jurisdiction. Multi-jurisdictional incidents, on the other hand, may be managed under a unified
command structure that includes representation from each jurisdiction. Supporting agencies also
assist through contributing valuable or unique resources; onsite representatives who are familiar
with the incident can provide expert information and assistance (Allred, 2004). The highway
safety procedures detailed here provide a valuable informational template for local, state and
federal agencies’ responses in the event of a weapon of mass destruction incident or other
terrorist attack (Allred, 2004).
The procedures would be exactly the same: A guideline is not only helpful, it is
imperative. However, in constructing a guideline for ICS-style cross-agency collaboration in the
event of terrorist attacks, researchers stress the need for flexibility such that first responders can
actually respond in the manner for which the situation calls and not be beholden to a set of
immutable rules in the guidelines. But as long as flexibility and malleability are built into the
guidelines, the same processes for traffic accidents can be extrapolated to define the roles of
various collaborating agencies in the event of another terrorist attack (USDOT-RITA, 2007).

I-35 Bridge Collapse

The Emergency Management and Response-Information Sharing and Analysis Center
(EMR-ISAC) stated that NIMS outlines were significantly realized when the I-35W Bridge
collapsed on August 1, 2007, in Minneapolis, Minnesota. After action summaries validate that
the Unified Command System component of the NIMS model allowed for a response that
Minneapolis Fire Chief Jim Clack described as:
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Having everyone on the same sheet of music. Quite simply, it (NIMS) worked because of
interagency training and support. Training exercises were conducted with regional
responders who participated in numerous exercises together so that, as Chief Clack said,
We all know each other and our capabilities. And, they were all there where they needed
to be. The exercises sure paid off (USFA, 2007, ¶ 12).
According to Hennepin County (Minnesota) Sheriff Rich Stanek, "We have a unified
command system now where everyone-police, fire, sheriff's office, doctors, coroners, local and
state and federal officials-operate under one voice" (USFA, 2007, ¶ 13). When the bridge fell,
unified command was implemented immediately and followed with the activation of a state
Emergency Operations Center (EOC) that included key personnel from all emergency response
organizations; state departments of agriculture, education, health, transportation, natural
resources, and human services; the Salvation Army; American Red Cross; and the city's finance
director (USFA, 2007) . The response involved at least 75 state, local, and federal agencies.
Incoming crews reported to staging areas established on both sides of the bridge. All responding
agencies operated under the 800 megahertz radio frequency system (VIPER) and communicated
successfully (USFA, 2007). In his report before the U.S. House Committee on Homeland
Security in September 2007 Secretary Michael Chertoff, Department of Homeland Security
(DHS), stated 75 interoperability scorecards were issued to urban and metropolitan local
jurisdictions. The scorecards focused on three topics: governance, standard operating procedures,
and equipment. Key findings include:
•
•

•

Policies for interoperable communications are now in place in all 75 urban and
metropolitan areas (¶ 18).
Regular testing and exercises are needed to effectively link disparate systems to allow
communications between multi-jurisdictional responders (including state and federal)
(¶ 19).
Cooperation among first responders in the field is strong, but formalized governance
(leadership and strategic planning) across regions needs further improvement (¶ 20).

Secretary Chertoff stated one urban area that scored well within the survey was the
Minneapolis/St. Paul urban area. Specifically, this areas training and capability were used during
the I-35 bridge collapse (USFA, 2007).
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Areas of Concern

Cole (2000) reported that the historical model of Incident Command (FIRESCOPE) had
originated within the fire service. Large and complex incidents with ever changing variables
tasked managers to the limit in placing equipment and personnel in the most efficient location
and time. The ICS system was born out of a specific need, to protect life and property from
California’s wild land fires. The original model concerned itself with only the fire service;
however, within this function elements of air operations, heavy equipment allocation and use,
staging areas, meteorological expertise, and logistical considerations for maintaining a workforce
in locations not designed or equipped to handle this footprint were involved. The numerous
functions associated with only one primary goal, to extinguish a fire, allowed FIRESCOPE to
evolve into the foundation of the Incident Command System. Incident managers realized to
manage one incident numerous disciplines must be employed to mitigate a crisis (Cole, 2000). In
1972 when the first seven regional fire service agencies met and developed FIRESCOPE training
and communications were primary issues in consolidating agencies separated by budget,
personnel, jurisdiction, and distance. Irwin (2000) reported the adoption of Incident Command
practices that were enveloped into the National Interagency Incident Management System
(NIIMS). Agencies throughout the United States were establishing protocols to manage criticalincidents.
Law enforcement agencies began to use ICS concepts in a vacuum, each agency prepared
policies and guidelines to manage its own issues (Cardwell & Clooney, 2000). Major planned
events, the 1984 Olympics held in Los Angeles, California and subsequent others allowed
enlightened law enforcement managers to see the ICS model in operation and incorporate
elements into their own policies. Traditionally, law enforcement operating within itself manages
the majority of incidents without extended duration on site, often within one operational cycle (8
to 12 hours) (Cardwell & Clooney, 2000). Law enforcement managers began to focus on using
the support functions of medical, fire, utility, and other agencies to mitigate a law enforcement
response. No common communication approach or previous interaction was in place prior to the
development of ICS concepts (Cardwell & Clooney, 2000). Previously, agencies only dealt with
unique logistical issues during the actual incident. This ad hoc approach lacked a structured
response and formalized agreements between agencies not normally associated with each other
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were needed (Cardwell & Clooney, 2000). Agencies need to integrate multidisciplinary
resources and responses from local, state, and federal resources. This integration must be made
with as little deviation as possible. Training and coordination must be addressed when
establishing new protocols highlighting the requirement for this standardization (Cardwell &
Clooney, 2000).
In 1993 the United States Attorney General was presented with a memorandum that
detailed possible command and control issues that could arise if individual federal, state, and
local agencies used their own management styles within a common incident (Rohen, 2001). New
federal protocols were established and training was conducted using the criteria established.
After action debriefings of those exercises indicated multiple agencies could function within the
new ICS concepts (Rohen, 2001). The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency
Assistance Act was signed into existence in 1988 (USGAO, 1997). This established the Federal
Emergency Management Agency as the lead agency for consequence management. In 1995 PDD
39 was signed, establishing the FBI as the lead agency for terrorism prevention and investigation
(USGAO, 1997). Both FEMA and the FBI along with a myriad of other federal, state and local
mitigation, support, and law enforcement agencies must function within a previously established
command structure at that time unknown to most with the exception of policy makers (Rohen,
2001). Again, the need for standardized training was made apparent in exercises such as
TOPOFF 1-4 (USDHS, 2009). Specifically, communications and coordination between agencies
using ICS criteria were cited as the most common barriers identified by participants.
State and local response examples from this literature review reinforced this concern and
placed emphasis on training and communication within all first responder entities. The Arizona
model of response established a level I, II, and III response protocol throughout the state. All
employees of Arizona’s Department of Public Safety were trained and knowledgeable of the
protocols used (Conner, 1997). Arizona was at the forefront of ICS integration with mandated
use of policies and the publication of a state-wide user friendly manual that eliminated confusion
from participants (Conner, 1997). Allred (2004) indicated the Model Procedures Guide (MPG)
published by the United States Department of Transportation provides real-life examples of
command structures for highway incidents. Responders must be knowledgeable (trained) of what
multidisciplinary agencies capabilities are. Allred stressed the procedures could be a valuable
resource or template for local, state, and federal agencies in responding to other incidents.
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In the collapse of the I-35 Bridge (USFA, 2007) details of the actual response of multiple
agencies around a multijurisdictional incident can be scaled when prior training,
communications, and shareholder buy in has occurred. Minneapolis Fire Chief Jim Clack
indicated that the past exercises and planning had worked (USFA, 2007). This one response
involved at least 75 state, local and federal agencies. Everyone could communicate with each
other within a new interoperable radio system (USFA, 2007).
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CHAPTER 3
METHODOLOGY

Approach

I sought to establish a link between law enforcement historical use of critical-incident
management collaborations both in practice and in training and current practices by Sheriffs’
Offices in North Carolina. The approach was to document historical use and implementation of
various Incident Command System/Incident Management Systems, identify techniques and
employ related joint task-force and collaborative recommendations through the literature review.
This study examined the extent to which cooperation and training exists with regard to managing
and preparing for major planned exercises and responding to unforeseen critical-incidents
involving multiple agencies on a state and local scale, specifically in all 100 North Carolina
Sheriff’s offices. In addition, the researcher determined the extent to which these various
agencies collaborated on scheduled cross-training projects, primarily designed for multi-agency,
multi-disciplinary responses from neighboring local jurisdictions in response to criticalincidents.

Survey Development

A survey designed specifically for this study was used (See Appendix A) to gather
information directly from all Sheriffs’ Offices in North Carolina. The survey was developed
through the reoccurring issues contained within the literature review. Training, collaboration
among neighboring first responder agencies and common shared communications were
identified as factors in the successful implementation and mitigation of actual events that
occurred. As Cardwell and Clooney (2000) suggested, agencies that actively disseminate and
encourage in-house proactive training are better prepared to respond to foreseeable incidents that
have a high probability of occurrence. Also discussed were the positive outcomes of agencies
that solicited other disciplines and neighboring jurisdictions to participate in training exercises
designed to mitigate incidents prior to an actual incident that had regional implications, I-35
Bridge Collapse (EMR-ISAC). The literature review identified as another concern within the
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inability to communicate within an incident. Common communications is one of the foundation
tenants of ICS (Cardwell & Clooney, 2000). Actual debriefings from agencies that have
experienced a multiagency critical-incident stressed the essential requirement of interoperable
communications in mitigation and management of a multiagency response (Rohen, 2001). The
survey (See Appendix A) was developed using these themes of proactive training, mandated
training, hours of training, topics, ICS exercises, actual events or incidents that have occurred,
intra-agency and multi-disciplinary cooperation within joint training exercises. The focus was on
qualitative and quantitative data both, with a strong emphasis on establishing examples through
quantitative data, and suggesting policy and other initiatives through qualitative data. Questions
were formatted from historical events, after action reports, and training debriefings.

Data Gathering Method

Data were gathered in this survey through direct telephone contact of all North Carolina’s
100 Sheriff’s offices. Initially, all telephone calls were made to either the Chief Deputy or the
Chief of Operations within each Sheriff’s Office. These individuals were identified from a 2008
North Carolina Sheriff’s Directory (North Carolina Sheriffs’ Association, 2009). During some of
the conversations with the Chief Deputy or Chief of Operations they would refer the questions
from the survey to be answered to other individuals assigned to a training division or other
member from administration. Of the 100 sheriffs’ offices contacted, 83 (83%) responded. At
least 5 attempts were made (and logged) to sheriff’s offices that did not return calls. The focus
was on both qualitative and quantitative data.

Data Analysis

The following strategies for data analysis were completed for the survey questions.
Frequency distributions were collected and studied. Specific attention was given to qualitative
responses provided, especially with agencies that had participated in multiagency training or
have experienced a multi-level critical-incident; sheriffs’ office training hours were compared
with the county population density, the region of the state the Sheriff’s Office was located, and
size of the law enforcement agency by using chi-square tests.
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The following strategies were used to answer the stated research questions:
Research Question #1: How many Sheriffs’ Offices complete more training than the
North Carolina Sheriffs’ Training & Standards Division requires? To answer this question,
frequency counts and percentages were calculated for survey items related to the type of format
(survey questions #3 and #5).
Research Question #2: Is there a difference between agency size (sworn officers
employed, survey question #3), county population (survey question #1), region of the state i.e.,
Mountains, Piedmont, and Coastal Plain, in requiring additional departmentally mandated
training hours? In answering this question, the respondent agencies were placed into three
classifications according to the number of sworn officers employed; small less than 50 sworn
officers, medium between 50 and 100 officers, and large, more than 100 officers. This
classification was obtained through the 2009 U.S. Department of Labor, Law Enforcement
Agencies Classification Index (USDOL, 2009). All Sheriffs’ Offices were coded within their
specific regions of North Carolina (Mountains, Piedmont, or Coastal Plain) as defined by the
North Carolina Department of Public Instruction (NCDPI, 2009). Classifications of County Size
were as follows; small, less than 40,000 in population, medium, between 40,000 and 80,000 and
large, over 80,000 in population. Three cross tabulated tables were created one for each of the
following independent variables: (a) agency size (small, medium, and large); (b) population
within each county; and (c) region. The dependent variable was whether the county exceeded the
24 hours of state mandated law enforcement in-service training. The following hypotheses were
tested with the chi-square test with alpha set at .05:

H021: There is no difference among small, medium, and large sheriffs’ offices that
exceeded the State mandated training hours.
H022: There is no difference among county populations and sheriffs’ offices that
exceeded the State mandated training hours.
H023: There is no difference in region of North Carolina sheriffs’ offices that exceeded
the State’s mandated Training hours.

Research Question #3: Is there a difference between agencies that have had a
multiagency exercise and increased training hour requirement and agencies that only met North
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Carolina training minimums and have not participated in a multiagency exercise? In answering
this question frequency counts, percentages and chi-square tests were calculated for survey items
related to the type of format.
Research Question #4: Is there a difference between agencies that have experienced a
multiagency response incident with increased training hour requirement and agencies that have
met only North Carolina training minimums and have not experienced a multiagency response?
Again, as with research question #3 frequency counts and percentages and chi-square tests were
calculated for survey items related to the type of format.
Research Question #5: Of the agencies that participate in an annual Incident Management
Exercise what were problems encountered within those exercises? To answer this question a
coding sheet was developed to interpret the qualitative data (Problems with Communication,
Training or lack of training, and Organization or Management of the exercise).
Research Question #6: Of the agencies that have experienced a multiagency criticalincident in the last 12 months what were problems encountered within those responses? This
question was answered by developing a coding sheet to interpret all qualitative data (Problems
with Communications, Organization or Management of the incident, and Training).

Summary

Chapter 3 consisted of the approach, survey development, data-gathering method, data
analysis, and a list of research questions and null hypotheses that were used for this study.
Chapter 4 presents the findings of the data analysis.
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CHAPTER 4
ANALYSIS OF THE DATA

The purpose of this study was to address the extent to which various local law
enforcement agencies, specifically all North Carolina Sheriff’s offices, work together on crosstraining projects primarily with neighboring law enforcement agencies’ response to criticalincidents. The goals of this research are to identify the dynamics that interplay between agency
cooperation in incident management and law enforcement; to determine what is being done to
enhance the public’s security; to determine, perhaps more importantly, what is not being done;
and to address recommendations for the future via data analysis and the presentation of this
document.
The population examined in this study consisted of all 100 Sheriffs’ Offices in North
Carolina. In preparing for this study a spreadsheet was designed to identify all Chief Deputies’ or
Operations Commanders in each of the 100 Sheriffs’ Offices. The survey was designed to be
administered via telephone to all commanders throughout the state. The responses were recorded
on this spreadsheet for data analysis. All 100 county Sheriffs’ Offices were contacted; however,
only 83 agencies participated in this survey. These 83 agencies were grouped initially into the
three geographic regions of North Carolina (See Table 1). Sheriffs’ Offices in the Mountain
region responded more frequently than Sheriffs’ Offices in Piedmont or Coastal Plain regions.
However, this overrepresentation was likely due to chance. This was demonstrated by applying a
chi-square test (X² (2) = .331, p =.85).

Table 1
Respondent Agencies in North Carolina (by Region)
Region
Coastal Plain
Piedmont
Mountains
Total

Respondent
Sheriffs’ Offices
21
39
23
83

Total Counties in
Region
27
49
24
100

Percentage of Respondents
in Region
77.8
79.6
95.8

Respondent agencies were then classified into size of the Sheriff’ Office. Office size was
deemed to be small if it had fewer than 50 sworn officers; medium if the agency had between 50
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and 100 sworn officers, and finally large if the Sheriff’s Office employed more than 100 sworn
officers (See Table 2). This classification was developed from the 2009 U.S. Department of
Labor, Law Enforcement Agencies Classification Index (USDOL, 2009). When compared to the
100 Sheriffs’ Offices in North Carolina medium sized offices were underrepresented. However,
by applying a chi-square test (X² (2) = .345, p =.84) this was not significant.

Table 2
Frequency Distribution of North Carolina Sheriffs’ Office Size
Category
Large
Medium
Small
Totals

Respondent
Sheriffs’ Offices
22
29
32
83

Total Sheriffs’ Offices
in North Carolina
23
38
39
100

Relative frequency
per Respondents (%)
26.5
34.9
38.5

Sheriffs’ Offices were then grouped by county population into three classifications; Small
if the population was less than 40,000; Medium if the population was between 40,000-80,000
and Large if the population exceeded 80,000 (See Table 3). This distribution was developed by
using the range of populations of the 83 respondents; small counties were the lower third of the
range, medium counties were the middle third and finally, large counties were the upper third of
the range. Smaller counties were underrepresented within the respondent Sheriff s’ Offices.
Respondent counties were compared with the classification of all North Carolina counties by
applying a chi-square test comparing the two distributions and was found to be insignificant (X²
(2) = .216, p =.90).

Table 3
Frequency Distribution of North Carolina County Size by Population
Category
Large
Medium
Small
Totals

Respondent
Sheriffs’ Offices
29
24
30
83

Total Sheriffs’ Offices
in North Carolina
32
29
39
100
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Relative frequency
per Respondents (%)
34.9
28.9
36.1

Analysis of the Research Questions

Surveys were administered by telephone to gather the data presented in the study. This
section is organized based on the order of the research questions presented in Chapters 1 and 3.

Research Question #1
How many Sheriffs’ Offices complete more training than the North Carolina Sheriffs’
Training & Standards Division requires?
To answer this question, frequency counts and percentages were calculated for survey
items related to the type of format. Of the 83 Sheriffs’ Offices that responded, 52 agencies
(62.8%) indicated they require more training than the 24 hours North Carolina Sheriffs’ Training
& Standards Division requires per year (See Table 4). Of these 52 responding agencies, most
significant were 14 agencies that require 32 hours of training (27% of the 52 respondents). Seven
agencies require 40 hours of training per year (13.5%) . One agency reported requiring 100 hours
of training and two agencies reported requiring 104 hours per year of mandated in-service
training.
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Table 4
Frequency and Number of Training Hours Required by North Carolina Sheriffs’ Offices
Number of
Sheriffs’ Offices

Hours of
Annual In-service
Mandated per
Officer

Relative
Frequency per
Category (%)

104
100
72
70
66
64
60
52
50
48
44
42
40
36
32
30
28

3.8
1.9
1.9
1.9
1.9
1.9
5.8
1.9
1.9
9.6
1.9
3.8
13.5
9.6
27.0
1.9
9.6

2

Total

1
1
1
1
1
3
1
1
5
1
2
7
5
14
1
5
52

Research Question 2
Is there a difference between Sheriff’s Office size (Sworn officers employed), county
population, or region of the state (Mountains, Piedmont, and Coastal Plain) in requiring
additional departmentally mandated training hours? The range of sworn officers within the 52
Sheriff’s offices that required more than the minimal training varied from 11 to 356 officers
(mean = 71). The 52 Offices were classified by the number of sworn officers employed (Small =
<50, Medium = 50-100, and Large = 100>).
Nineteen (36.5%) of the 52 Sheriff’s offices were classified as large (See Table 5), in
comparision, only 26.5% of the 83 survey respondents were classified as large. Twenty agencies
(38.5%) were classified as medium as compared to 34.9% of the survey respondents. Finally,
Thirteen (25%) agencies were classified as small in comparsion to 38.5% of the survey
respondents.
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Table 5
52 Sheriffs’ Offices Size by Sworn Officers Employed
Category
Large
Medium
Small
Total

Frequency per
category
19
20
13
52

Relative frequency
per category (%)
36.5
38.5
25.0

When compared to the 31 agencies that do not require additional training only 3 Sheriff’s offices
(9.7%) were classified as large. Eleven Sheriff’s offices were classified as medium (35.5%) and
the majority of Sheriff’s offices that do not require additional training were classified as small,
17 Sheriff’s offices (54.8%) (See Table 6).

Table 6
31 Sheriffs’ Offices Size by Sworn Officers Employed
Category
Large
Medium
Small
Total

Frequency per
category
3
11
17
31

Relative frequency
per category (%)
9.7
35.5
54.8

In order to determine whether or not the observed sample was representative of the 83
respondents within the population, two single-sample chi-square tests were conducted to
compare the proportions of the respondents from the Small, Medium, and Large Sheriffs’ Offices
in the survey to the 52 agencies that exceeded the mandated inservice training. There was no
significant difference between the observed sample (52 agencies) and that of the 83 respondents
relating to the size of the agency (X² (2) = 2.32, p =.31). A chi-square test was used to determine
if there was a significant difference between the size of Sheriff’s offices that required additional
training and the 31 Sheriff’s offices that did not (X² (2) = 10.1, p < .05) . There was a significant
difference among the 31 Sheriff’s offices that do not require additional training. It is likely the
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smaller the Sheriff’s Office the less likely it would engage in additional training beyond what
North Carolina mandates. The null hypothesis was rejected.
The counties were then coded into population categories of small, population of less than
40,000, medium population between 40,000 and 80,000, and large with population of 80,000+.
Twenty-two (42.3%) counties were classified as large (population over 80,000) of the 52
counties as compared to twenty-nine (34.9%) of the 83 survey respondents classified as large.
Fourteen (26.9%) counties were classified as medium as opposed to twenty-four (29%) of survey
respondents. Sixteen (30.8%) counties were coded as small as compared to thirty (36.1%) of the
survey counties. In order to determine whether or not the observed sample was representative of
the 83 respondents within the population, two single-sample chi-square tests were conducted to
compare the proportions of the respondents from the Small, Medium, and Large Counties based
on population in the survey to the 52 agencies that exceeded the mandated in-service training.
There was no significant difference between the observed sample (52 agencies) and that of the
83 agencies relating to the size of the county (X² (2) = 3.43, p =.18). Comparison between the 52
Sheriff’s offices (See Table 8), requiring additional training and the 31 Sheriff’s offices (See
Table 7) that require only North Carolina minimums was completed by using a chi-square test
with alpha set at .05 (X² (2) = 3.47, p =.17). The null hypothesis cannot be rejected.
Table 7
31 North Carolina Sheriffs’Offices of County Population Size (Minimum Training Only)
County Size
(Population)
Large
Medium
Small
Total

Frequency per
category
7
10
14
31
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Relative frequency per
category (%)
22.6
32.2
45.2

Table 8
52 North Carolina Sheriffs’Offices of County Population Size (Additional Training Only)
County Size
(Population)
Large
Medium
Small
Total

Frequency per
category
22
14
16
52

Relative frequency per
category (%)
42.3
26.9
30.8

In order to determine whether or not the observed sample was representative of the 83
respondents within the population, two single-sample chi-square tests were conducted to
compare the proportions of the respondents from the Coastal, Piedmont, and Mountain regions of
the state to the 52 agencies that exceeded the mandated in-service training). There was no
significant difference between the observed sample (52 agencies) and that of the 83 respondents’
relating to the region of the state (X² (2) =.149, p = .93). Of the 52 agencies mandating additional
training thirteen (25%) counties were located in North Carolina’s Coastal Plain as compared to
twenty-one (25%) of the survey respondents. Thirteen (25%) counties were from the Mountain
region as compared to twenty-three (27.7%) from the survey. Twenty-six (50%) counties were
from the Piedmont region as compared to thirty-nine (47%) from the survey counties (See Table
9). Compared to the 83 respondents, the 52 agencies mirror the distribution from specific regions
within North Carolina.

Table 9
52 North Carolina Sheriff’s offices within Region (Additional Training)
Region
of N.C.
Coastal
Piedmont
Mountains
Total

Frequency per
category
13
26
13
52

Relative frequency per
category (%)
25
50
25

There was no significant difference among the regions of the state as to whether or not Sheriff’s
offices required additional training when compared to the 31 Sheriff’s offices that only complied
with North Carolina’s minimum training requirement (X² (2) = .643, p = .73). The null
hypothesis was retained (See Table 10).
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Table 10
31 North Carolina Sheriffs’Offices within Region (Minimum Training Only)
Region
of N.C.
Coastal
Piedmont
Mountains
Total

Frequency per
category
8
13
10
31

Relative frequency per
category (%)
25.8
42
32.2

Research Question 3
Is there a difference between agencies that have had a multiagency exercise and increased
training hour requirement and agencies that only met North Carolina training minimum and have
not participated in a multiagency exercise? Forty (76.9%) of the 52 agencies indicated they
participate in at least one annual critical-incident, multiagency exercise (See Table 11). When
compared with the 31 agencies that only require North Carolina minimum standards in training
hours that have participated in a multiagency exercise (See Table 12) Eighteen (58.1%) Sheriffs’
Offices conducted or participated in an annual Critical-incident Exercise. Thirteen (41.9%)
agencies that require state minimums in training hours did not participate in any exercises.

Table 11
52 North Carolina Sheriffs’ Offices Requiring Additional Training
Annual
Multiagency
Exercise
No
Yes
Total

Frequency per
category

Relative frequency per
category (%)

12
40
52

23.1
76.9

Table 12
31 North Carolina Sheriffs’ Offices requiring only State Minimum Training
Annual
Multiagency
Exercise
No
Yes
Total

Frequency per
category

Relative frequency per
category (%)

13
18
31

41.9
58.1
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A comparison was completed using a chi-square test between the 52 Sheriff’s offices that require
additional training and the 31 Offices that only comply with North Carolina minimum standards.
No significant difference was detected between the two distributions (X² (1) = 3.28, p = .07).

Research Question 4
Is there a difference between agencies that have experienced a multiagency response
incident with increased training hour requirement and agencies that have met only North
Carolina training minimum and have not experienced a multiagency response? Twenty-five
(48.1%) of the 52 agencies responded they have had a Critical-incident involving a multiagency
response (See Table 13) as opposed to 27 agencies that have not experienced an multiagency
response incident. In comparing the 52 agencies to the 31 agencies that only require state
minimum in training hours, only 12 agencies (38.7%) had experienced a multiagency incident
(X² (1) = .69, p = .41). The majority of agencies, nineteen (61.3%) did not experience such an
incident (See Table 14). A difference was observed between the two distributions. Sheriff’s
offices that did not experience a multiagency incident were more likely to train officers within
the North Carolina minimum standard requirements.

Table 13
52 North Carolina Sheriffs’ Offices Requiring Additional Training
Multiagency
Incident
No
Yes
Total

Frequency per
category
27
25
52

Relative frequency per
category (%)
51.9
48.1

Table 14
31 North Carolina Sheriffs’ Offices Requiring Only State Minimum Training
Multiagency
Incident
No
Yes
Total

Frequency per
category
19
12
31
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Relative frequency per
category (%)
61.3
38.7

Research Question 5
Of the agencies that participate in an annual Multiagency Exercise what were problems
encountered within those exercises? The responses from all 83 respondents were coded from
answers provided. Forty agencies (from the 52 agencies requiring more training hours) and 18
agencies (from the 31 agencies that only complete state minimum training hours) stated they had
completed annual multiagency training exercises. All responses from these agencies were placed
into one of three groups:

1) Communications Problems- uncommon radio frequencies or the inability to monitor
other first responder agencies radio traffic.
2) Organizational Problems- the exercise was too large and relied heavily on the
administration (paperwork) and only limited input from field officers. Shareholder
buy in was not observed from all first responder agencies. The exercise was not based
in reality (improper planning).
3) Training Problems- the inability to train, because of time, funding or support. Law
enforcement was placed within a support role during most of these multiagency
exercises. The inability for law enforcement agency to fund discipline specific
scenarios.

Fifty-three (63.9%) of the 83 respondents indicated they had no issues with the exercise or the
question did not apply because the agency had not participated in an annual exercise (See Table
15).
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Table 15
Annual Multiagency Exercise Problems Coded
Identified Multiagency Exercise
Problems

Number of Sheriffs’
Offices

Relative Frequency
per Category (%)

Communications Problems

14

16.9

Organizational Problems

8

9.6

Training Problems

8

9.6

Not Applicable

53

63.9

Total

83

Fourteen agencies (16.9%) reported communication problems. Two of the 14 agencies
reported having multiple problems with communications as well as training concerns; however,
communication was the first priority. Eleven of the 14 agencies reported the major problem with
communications was the lack of interoperability (common frequency and radio band range for
all responders) and the need for additional transceiver units within each county was mentioned as
a problem in allowing more first responder entities communicating between each other during
exercises and incidents.
The next category was organization. Eight agencies (9.6%) reported issues with the
organization before, during and after the exercises. Comments from these agencies varied from
not having enough shareholder participation from agencies in the planning and implementation
stages to the exercises were too technical, too large and relied too heavily on managing
administrative aspects of the exercise itself. Additional comments concerned the realistic nature
of the exercise they had experienced and wanted a more practicable exercise identified to be
implemented.
The final category, Training, was reported by eight agencies (9.6%) to be of concern.
Agencies indicated they lacked the supplemental funding required to design and implement their
own exercises and had to rely on other first responder agencies to provide funding. Interestingly
of the 83 respondents only 4 agencies (4.8%) had access to external funding (survey question
#7). Two agencies had Department of Homeland Security grants for specific teams training, one
agency had a Bureau of Justice grant that required local matching funds from another first
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responder agency to design, implement and evaluate for one single, very specific and highly
restrictive exercise (McGuire Nuclear Station) and the last agency relied on funding from the
Emergency Medical Service in that county for the exercise. Additional comments identified the
size and scope of the exercise and the degree of law enforcement involvement during the
training. Essentially law enforcement served as support personnel during mass casualty scenarios
or other medical related training events.

Research Question 6
Of the agencies that have experienced a multiagency critical-incident what were
problems encountered within those responses? The responses from all 83 respondents were
coded from answers provided in the survey. Of the 83 respondents, Sixty-three (75.9%) indicated
they had no issues with the incident or the agencies have not had a multiagency response within
the last 12 months (See Table 16).

Table 16
Multiagency Incident Problems Coded
Identified Multiagency Incident
Problems

Number of Sheriffs’
Offices

Relative Frequency
per Category (%)

Communications Problems

10

12.0

Communication-Organization

6

7.2

Organizational Problems

1

1.2

Training Problems

2

2.4

Training-Communication

1

1.2

Not Applicable

63

75.9

Total

83

Ten agencies (12.05%) had problems with communications, again as with answers from
research question #5, interoperability and not enough transceivers for everyone to use was the
main concern from postincident debriefings (See Table 16). Six agencies (7.2%) had both
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communications and organizational issues. Two of these cited communication interoperability
and their agencies inexperience with working with outside disciplines during the actual criticalincident (Emergency Medical Service and Emergency Management). One agency responded
with organizational issues in that it was almost three hours into the incident before critical staff
was present “on-scene” to advise and make proper notifications and requests for additional
resources. The final three agencies had both Training (2 agencies) and a combination of Training
and Communication issues (1 agency). Two agencies reported their officers were functioning in
roles they were not trained for.
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CHAPTER 5
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Summary
The purpose of this study was to determine North Carolina Sheriffs’ Offices work
together on cross-training projects primarily within neighboring local jurisdictions’ response to
critical-incidents. The goal of this research was to identify the dynamics that interplay between
law enforcement agency cooperation and incident management; to determine what is being done
to enhance the public’s security; to determine, perhaps more importantly, what is not being done;
and to address recommendations for the future data analysis and the presentation of a template
for future cooperation, cross-training efforts and future grant applications designed to mitigate
the cost of implementation of such a program. This section presents a review of the results of the
data and interpretation of the statistical results of the survey located in Appendix A. The survey
statements were analyzed using quantitative and qualitative methods using descriptive and
inferential statistics. Six research questions were analyzed for the purpose of this study.

Research Questions
Research Question #1
Research question #1 focused on how many Sheriffs’ Offices completed more training
than the North Carolina Sheriffs’ Training & Standards Division requires? North Carolina
requires 24 hours of in-service training for the year 2009. The survey results showed that of the
83 respondents 52 Sheriffs’ Offices required more than 24 hours of in-service mandated by the
North Carolina Sheriffs’ Training and Standards Division in the calendar year 2009. Of those 52
Offices several patterns emerged;
1) Fourteen (27%) of the Sheriff’s offices required 32 hours of training per year.
2) Seven (13.5 %) required 40 hours of in-service training per year.
3) There were three groups of five (9.6% each) Sheriff’s offices requiring 28, 36, and 48
hours of training per year.
4) Two (3.8%) Sheriff’s offices required 104 hours per year in training.
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Research Question #2
Research question #2 focused on whether there was a difference between Sheriff’s Office
size (sworn officers employed, survey question #3), county population (survey question #1),
region of the state i.e., Mountains, Piedmont, and Coastal Plain, in requiring additional
departmentally mandated training hours?
The 52 Sheriff’s offices that had higher training requirements were grouped into
classifications of large, medium, and small dependent on how many sworn officers each had. Of
the 52 Sheriff’s offices, nineteen (36.5%) were classified as large this compared to the 83
agencies in the survey population that only contained twenty-two (26.5%) offices. Twenty
Sheriff’s offices (38.5%) of the 52 were classified as medium as compared to twenty-nine
(34.9%) of the 83 survey respondents. Thirteen (25%) Sheriff’s offices of the 52 were classified
as small compared to thirty-two (38.5%) offices classified as small from the 83 survey
respondents. There was a significant difference among the 31 Sheriff’s offices that do not require
additional training (X² (2) = 10.1, p < .05). The null hypothesis was rejected. From the data
presented it would be more likely for a larger agency to exceed the state’s training requirement
rather than a smaller one.
North Carolina counties were classified by population into small (under 40,000), medium
(40,000-80,000), and large (over 80,000) counties. The 100 Sheriff’s Offices in North Carolina
were classified by size into the following; 32 large agencies, 29 medium agencies, and 39 small
agencies. Of the 52 agencies that exceeded the state mandated 24 in-service hours 22 (42.3%)
were classified as large compared to 7 (22.6%) agencies from the 31 Sheriff’s Offices that only
required state training minimums. Fourteen counties (26.9%) were classified as medium
compared to 10 (32.2%) from the 31 Sheriff’s Offices that only require state minimums. Sixteen
counties (30.8%) were coded as small as compared to 14 counties (45.2%) from the 31 Sheriff’s
Offices requiring state minimums. There was no significant difference between the observed 52
Sheriff’s offices that required more training in comparison to the 31 Sheriff’s offices that met
North Carolina minimums pertaining to the county population (X² (2) = 3.47, p = .17). The null
hypothesis could not be rejected.
The third segment of this question focused on if there was a difference between the
region an agency was in and increased training requirement? All North Carolina counties were
coded into their various regions as listed by the North Carolina Department of Instruction
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(Mountains, Piedmont, and Coastal Plain). In comparing the 31 Sheriff’s offices that met only
North Carolina minimums with the 52 Sheriffs’ Offices that exceeded minimum standards (X²
(2) = .643, p = .73) the null hypothesis could not be rejected.

Research Question #3
Is there a difference between agencies that have had a multiagency exercise and increased
training hour requirement and agencies that only met North Carolina training minimums and had
not participated in a multiagency exercise? Forty (76.9%) of the 52 agencies indicated they had
participated in at least one annual critical-incident, multiagency exercise as compared to eighteen
(58.1%) of the 31 Sheriff’s offices that met only North Carolina minimum standards. This
comparison resulting in chi-square (X² (1) = 3.28, p = .07) demonstrated a slight increase within
the frequency distribution of the number of agencies engaging in an annual multiagency training
exercise and mandating increased training requirements beyond the state minimum requirements.

Research Question #4
Is there a difference between agencies that have experienced a multiagency response
incident with increased training hour requirement and agencies that have met only North
Carolina training minimums and had not experienced a multiagency response? Twenty-five
(48.1%) of the 52 agencies responded they have had a multiagency incident as compared to
twelve (38.7%) of the 31 Sheriffs’ Offices that complied with the state’s minimum standards (X²
(1) = .69, p = .41). The frequency distribution demonstrated an increase in the number of
Sheriffs’ Offices that had encountered a multiagency incident and required increased training
within their department.

Research Question #5
In research question #5 the focus was on agencies that participate in an annual Incident
Management Exercise what were problems encountered within those exercises? Fourteen
(16.87%) of the 83 survey respondents indicated the major problem identified from postexercise
debriefing was communications. Respondents indicated they had no common frequency between
all responders participating within the exercise or enough radio transceivers to give out to all
responders. Eight agencies (9.6%) reported concerns with the organization of the exercise in
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timing, realism, and management during the event. Eight agencies (9.6%) also indicated training
was a factor. Comments ranged from lack of training, no funding for training, no equipment for
training, scenarios designed and used were unrealistic, and training did not include enough
disciplines.

Research Question #6
Research question #6 asked of the agencies that have experienced a multiagency criticalincident in the last 12 months what were problems the agencies experienced? Of the 83
respondents, 63 (75.9%) indicated they had no issues with the incident or have not had a
multiagency response within the last 12 months. As with research question #5, the major
problem reported from agencies that have experienced a multiagency response, 10 agencies
(12.05%) reported communications as being the major problem. Six agencies (7.23%) reported a
combination of communication and organization as the problem in mitigating the incident at
hand.

Conclusions

The following conclusions were made based on the analysis of the study’s findings:
1. Of the 83 survey respondents, 52 (62.8%) Sheriffs’ Offices required more than the 24
hours mandated by the North Carolina Sheriffs’ Training and Standards Division.
From those 52 Sheriff’s offices clear patterns emerged regarding the additional hours
of training each agency mandated, 27% of the offices required 32 hours of annual
training and 7.5% required 40 hours of annual training. The study’s findings indicate
more than half of the 83 respondents required more training than North Carolina
mandates per year.
2. North Carolina Sheriffs’ Offices pertaining to sworn officer strength were classified
as small, medium, and large departments. The data indicate larger Sheriff’s offices
are engaging in more training than smaller departments. The geographic region
(Mountains, Piedmont, or Coastal Plain) was found not to be a factor between
agencies requiring additional training and agencies that only met state minimums.
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3. An increase in training was measured within agencies that had an annual multiagency
exercise and increased training requirement (52 Sheriff’s offices) compared to the 31
Sheriff’s offices that only required North Carolina minimum standards (76.9%
compared to 58.1%).
4. An increase in training was also visible within agencies that had experienced a
multiagency incident and required increased training when compared to the Sheriff’s
offices that met state minimum standards (48.1% compared to 38.7%).
5. Problems encountered during multiagency exercises from all 83 survey respondents
were comparatively common. The largest group (16.87%) reported communication
issues during the exercises. Eight agencies (9.6%) reported having problems with the
organization of the exercise. Comments included lack of realism, timing (lack of
adequate time to complete the exercise), and management of the exercise itself. Eight
agencies (9.6%) indicated training (or lack of training) as a major factor in the
exercises. Comments from lack of training, little or no funding for training and the
lack of various extraneous disciplines during the exercises, namely utilities, janitorial
staff, and public works.
6. Problems with communication was the predominate issue with agencies that have
experienced a multiagency incident followed by agencies having combined issues
with communications and organization during the incident.

Recommendations for Practice

1. Multiagency training married with preplanned, well organized, and realistic
scenarios, benefits all agencies within a jurisdiction. Agencies should invest heavily
in identifying probable incidents that could occur within their respective counties and
solicit nontraditional shareholders to participate in these well-managed events.
2. Given the 30 problems identified from Sheriffs’ Offices that have experienced a
multiagency exercise and the 20 problems identified by Sheriffs’ Offices that
responded to a multiagency incident, law enforcement agencies should concentrate on
mitigating three issues with a high probability of occurrence found within this study;
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interoperable communications, management or organization of the incident, training
or a lack of training, or finally a combination of all three.
3. This study found that only 4 out of 83 agencies had access to external grant funding.
Additional research should focus on targeting avenues of support from federal, state
and nontraditional sources (foundation and private businesses). The lack of funding is
a major barrier to designing, planning, implementing, and evaluating future training.
Funding is required for agencies with smaller staffing to use their strained resources
more effectively. External funding could provide access to specific communications
equipment necessary for interoperable continuity across disciplines as well.

Recommendations for Further Research

The findings revealed that most North Carolina Sheriffs’ Offices exceed the minimum
required hours of training. Further study should also be conducted to determine exactly what
specific topics or subject matter these agencies are requiring. Additional research of this type
should be focused in other states to observe if any patterns can be replicated.
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APPENDENICES
Appendix A
Interview Protocol

“Hello, my name is Major Greg Minton, with the Wilkes County Sheriff’s Office. I am
calling you to see if you would mind answering some questions concerning critical response
management and training your agency participates in? This will only take a few minutes of your
time.
Question #1: County Population?
Question #2: Number of Agency Employees (sworn officers)?
Question #3: The number of required training hours per year your agency requires?
Question #4: Does your agency mandate cross-training (multi-disciplinary) with other
first responder entities
Question #5: The number of mandated training hours required by North Carolina and
your agency per year?
Question #6: Has your agency ever cross-trained with any other first responder agency?
Question #7: Are there any grants or other sources of funding for ICS or NIMS training?
Question #8: Does your agency participate in at least one Incident Management exercise
per year?
Question #9: (If Q6 yes) How many agencies participated in these exercise(s)?
Question #10: Which agency was in charge/control of the exercise(s)?
Question #11: What were some of the problems identified during the/these exercise(s)?
Question #12: What were some of the possible solutions identified?
Question #13: Has your agency ever experienced an actual ICS incident?
Question #14: How many agencies participated during this/these incident(s)?
Question #15: Were there any problems encountered in these incidents?
Question #16: Other remarks.
Thank you for your participation”.
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Appendix B
Survey Record
County

Alamance

Alexander

Alleghany

Anson

Region

Piedmont

Piedmont

Mountain

Piedmont

County
Population

142,661

33,603

10,677

25,275

Number of
Agency
Employees
(Sworn
Officers)

125

25

12

25

AGENCY SIZE

Large

Small

Small

Small

No

No

No

No

36

24

32

24

Cross
Training
Completed
with other
agencies?

Alamance
Community
College
coordinates
our in‐service
training

SRT team only

Yes/ one day Training Event/
Rapid Shooter

occasionally

Agency
participate in
at least one
yearly
Critical
incident
Exercise?

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

How Many
Agencies
Participated
in Exercise?

The whole
county
participates in
a massive
exercise once
per year

Sheriff &
Taylorsville
Police

EMS/Hospital/Fire/City/Blue
Ridge Pwkay

8

Cross
Training
Mandated
with other
agencies?
Hours of
Mandated
Training?
(Within
Agency)
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County

Alamance

Alexander

Alleghany

Anson

Agency in
Charge of
Coordination?

Emergency
Management,
Fire Marshall,
and SO

Police
Department

EMS

Emergency
Management

Communications

Unknown

None

normal chaos

COMM

N/A

N/A

ORGAN

Possible
Solutions to
Identified
Problems

more money for
communications
equipment

Unknown

N/A

Evacuations

Has Agency had
an ICS Incident?

N/A

6 or 8 months
ago Barricaded
Subject

Yes/ Search lost
person

locally

INCIDENT

NO

YES

YES

NO

N/A

N/A

Every 2 to 3
months

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

3 Catawba/SHP

Rescue Squad/
Fire/SHP/Sheriff/
Wilkes/EM

N/A

Identified
Problems
Encountered
with Exercises
(PostExercise
Analysis)
EXERCISE
PROBLEM
CODED

Identified
Problems with
ICS Incident
(PostIncident
Analysis)
INCIDENT
PROBLEM
CODED

How Many
Agencies were
Involved?

N/A
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County

Ashe

Avery

Beaufort

Bertie

Region

Mountain

Mountain

Coastal

Coastal

County
Population

27,372

17,946

44,958

19,773

Number of
Agency
Employees
(Sworn
Officers)

23

23

55

24

AGENCY SIZE

Small

Small

Medium

Small

No

No

No

No

24

24

48

24

Cross
Training
Completed
with other
agencies?

No

occasionally

occasionally

None

Agency
participate in
at least one
yearly
Critical
incident
Exercise?

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

How Many
Agencies
Participated
in Exercise?

3 LE, Fire, EM
and EMS

N/A

4

4

Cross
Training
Mandated
with other
agencies?
Hours of
Mandated
Training?
(Within
Agency)
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County

Ashe

Avery

Beaufort

Bertie

Agency in
Charge of
Coordination?

Emergency
Management

N/A

Community
College

SO

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Possible
Solutions to
Identified
Problems

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Has Agency had
an ICS Incident?

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

INCIDENT

NO

NO

NO

NO

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Identified
Problems
Encountered
with Exercises
(PostExercise
Analysis)
EXERCISE
PROBLEM
CODED

Identified
Problems with
ICS Incident
(PostIncident
Analysis)
INCIDENT
PROBLEM
CODED

How Many
Agencies were
Involved?
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County

Bertie

Bladen

Buncombe

Burke

Region

Coastal

Coastal

Mountain

Mountain

County
Population

19,773

32,278

217,531

92,000

Number of
Agency
Employees
(Sworn
Officers)

24

60

239

104

AGENCY SIZE

Small

Medium

Large

Large

No

No

Yes

No

24

70

36

24

Cross
Training
Completed
with other
agencies?

None

It Varies from
Subject
Matter, Rapid
Deployment,
NIMS,
Defensive
Driving with
other LE
agencies

Yes/Dependant on Teams

Yes

Agency
participate in
at least one
yearly
Critical
incident
Exercise?

Yes

No

Yes

No

How Many
Agencies
Participated
in Exercise?

4

N/A

Jackson County Tabletop 8
agencies/ Tactical

In County

Cross
Training
Mandated
with other
agencies?
Hours of
Mandated
Training?
(Within
Agency)
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County

Bertie

Bladen

Buncombe

Burke

Agency in
Charge of
Coordination?

SO

N/A

Regional Board

SO

N/A

N/A

None

Communications

N/A

N/A

N/A

COMM

Possible
Solutions to
Identified
Problems

N/A

N/A

None

Unknown

Has Agency had
an ICS Incident?

N/A

Leak at the
Dupont Plant
(Mass Event)

No

No

INCIDENT

NO

YES

NO

NO

Identified
Problems with
ICS Incident
(PostIncident
Analysis)

N/A

Emergency
Manager had quit
and we had to
pick it up, little or
no relief, lack of
communication
and coordination
w/I the incident

N/A

Communications

INCIDENT
PROBLEM
CODED

N/A

COMM AND
ORGAN

N/A

COMM

N/A

5 Sheriff’s offices,
Numerous other
local LE agencies,
and Support
Agencies

N/A

5

Identified
Problems
Encountered
with Exercises
(PostExercise
Analysis)
EXERCISE
PROBLEM
CODED

How Many
Agencies were
Involved?

84

County

Cabarrus

Caldwell

Camden

Carteret

Region

Piedmont

Mountain

Coastal

Coastal

County
Population

157,176

78,664

9,600

63,511

Number of
Agency
Employees
(Sworn
Officers)

235

60

17

40

AGENCY SIZE

Large

Medium

Small

Small

No

No

No

No

50

32

24

24

Cross
Training
Completed
with other
agencies?

Firearms,
Bloodborne
and HazMat

Yes

None

Yes SRT
Teams

Agency
participate
in at least
one yearly
Critical
incident
Exercise?

Yes

Yes

No

No

How Many
Agencies
Participated
in Exercise?

Terrorist
Threat inside
a Mall all
first
responder
agencies
attended

Fire/EMS/Emergency
Management/Sheriff/Granite
Falls, Another LE

N/A

N/A

Cross
Training
Mandated
with other
agencies?
Hours of
Mandated
Training?
(Within
Agency)

85

County

Cabarrus

Caldwell

Camden

Carteret

Agency in
Charge of
Coordination?

Emergency
Management

Sheriff

N/A

N/A

Communications

Communications

N/A

N/A

COMM

COMM

N/A

N/A

More Viper
Radios

More
Infrastructure

N/A

N/A

N/A

Identified
Problems
Encountered
with Exercises
(PostExercise
Analysis)
EXERCISE
PROBLEM
CODED
Possible
Solutions to
Identified
Problems
Has Agency had
an ICS Incident?

N/A

Yes

two (plane
crash) and
Large wild land
fire

INCIDENT

NO

YES

YES

NO

N/A

Coordination and
Communication

Money and
Resources
needed

N/A

N/A

COMM AND
ORGAN

TRAINING

N/A

N/A

2 Major LE
Agencies Lenoir
PD and Sheriff

SHP, EMS, DOT,
NC Fire

0

Identified
Problems with
ICS Incident
(PostIncident
Analysis)
INCIDENT
PROBLEM
CODED

How Many
Agencies were
Involved?

86

County

Caswell

Catawba

Chatham

Cherokee

Region

Piedmont

Piedmont

Piedmont

Mountain

County
Population

23,501

154,000

60,000

24,298

Number of
Agency
Employees
(Sworn
Officers)

36

128

85

25

AGENCY SIZE

Small

Large

Medium

Small

No

No

No

No

28

72

28

24

Cross
Training
Mandated
with other
agencies?
Hours of
Mandated
Training?
(Within
Agency)
Cross
Training
Completed
with other
agencies?

SERT

STAR Team/Multi agency
SWAT

None

Yes
Multiagency
response to
Active
Shooter in
Schools

Agency
participate
in at least
one yearly
Critical
incident
Exercise?

No

No

Yes

Yes

How Many
Agencies
Participated
in Exercise?

N/A

N/A

Harris Nuclear
Plant Exercise

3 LE, Fire,
EM and
EMS

87

County

Caswell

Catawba

Chatham

Cherokee

Agency in
Charge of
Coordination?

N/A

Sheriff

Emergency
Management

Emergency
Management

N/A

Communications

Communications

Only complete
training once per
year

N/A

COMM

COMM

TRAINING

Possible
Solutions to
Identified
Problems

N/A

More Viper
Radios

None

More Training

Has Agency had
an ICS Incident?

Yes Missing
Person/Numerous
Agencies

Boatapaluza
(lake Norman)

N/A

Yes/Bomb
Threats in two
high schools

INCIDENT

YES

YES

NO

YES

Communications

None, 20
agencies
represented
Comm. worked
great

N/A

Communications
and Organization

COMM

N/A

N/A

COMM AND
ORGAN

EM/2 Fire Depts

20 LE agencies

10 Fire/EMS/LE

4 LE with Fire,
EM and EMS

Identified
Problems
Encountered
with Exercises
(PostExercise
Analysis)
EXERCISE
PROBLEM
CODED

Identified
Problems with
ICS Incident
(PostIncident
Analysis)
INCIDENT
PROBLEM
CODED

How Many
Agencies were
Involved?

88

County

Chowan

Clay

Cleveland

Craven

Region

Coastal

Mountain

Piedmont

Coastal

County
Population

14,526

9,876

99,032

94,875

Number of
Agency
Employees
(Sworn
Officers)

17

13

86

60

AGENCY SIZE

Small

Small

Medium

Medium

No

No

No

No

104

40

60

24

None

Cross
Training
Mandated
with other
agencies?
Hours of
Mandated
Training?
(Within
Agency)
Cross
Training
Completed
with other
agencies?

SWAT

occasionally

Rapid Deployment
Training, 1 week of
additional Sheriff's
Choice

Agency
participate
in at least
one yearly
Critical
incident
Exercise?

No

No

Yes

No

N/A

Other agencies are
welcome to
participate in all of
our training

N/A

How Many
Agencies
Participated
in Exercise?

N/A
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County

Chowan

Clay

Cleveland

Craven

Agency in
Charge of
Coordination?

N/A

N/A

Emergency
Management

N/A

N/A

N/A

table top only

N/A

N/A

N/A

ORGAN

N/A

Possible
Solutions to
Identified
Problems

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Has Agency had
an ICS Incident?

N/A

Yes

Meth labs

N/A

INCIDENT

NO

YES

YES

NO

N/A

Coordination and
Communication

All agencies in
the county are
on the state
viper system
(excellent)

N/A

N/A

COMM AND
ORGAN

N/A

N/A

N/A

4 LE

4 usually, SO,
SBI,

N/A

Identified
Problems
Encountered
with Exercises
(PostExercise
Analysis)
EXERCISE
PROBLEM
CODED

Identified
Problems with
ICS Incident
(PostIncident
Analysis)
INCIDENT
PROBLEM
CODED

How Many
Agencies were
Involved?
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County

Cumberland

Currituck

Dare

Davidson

Region

Piedmont

Coastal

Coastal

Piedmont

County
Population

302,963

23,500

40,000

147,246

Number of
Agency
Employees
(Sworn
Officers)

350

67

56

131

AGENCY SIZE

Large

Medium

Medium

Large

No

No

No

No

48

32

52

42

18 hours of
Firearms/
Cross Train
with
Lexington
PD (SRT
Teams only)

Cross
Training
Mandated
with other
agencies?
Hours of
Mandated
Training?
(Within
Agency)
Cross
Training
Completed
with other
agencies?

Infrequently

None

All training is
inhouse and is
open to other
agencies

Agency
participate
in at least
one yearly
Critical
incident
Exercise?

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Sheriff/EM/Fire/other LE

Sheriff, Marine
Fisheries, State
Parks and other
Agencies
participate

NIMS with
the
Emergency
Management
Division
(Active
Shooter)

How Many
Agencies
Participated
in Exercise?

Varies year
to year on
subject
matter
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County

Cumberland

Currituck

Dare

Davidson

Agency in
Charge of
Coordination?

EM

EM

Sheriff

Emergency
Manager

Communications

Communications

None

Notification of
Training

COMM

COMM

N/A

ORGAN

Possible
Solutions to
Identified
Problems

More Radios

More Radios

N/A

More advance
Notification

Has Agency had
an ICS Incident?

Barricaded
Subject

N/A

Storms all of
them require a
multiple agency
response

Lexington PD
Officer Down 4
LE agencies in
the county

INCIDENT

YES

NO

YES

YES

Communications

N/A

N/A

None

COMM

N/A

N/A

N/A

2 LE, Fire, EMS

N/A

More than 10 LE

All 4 in Davidson
County

Identified
Problems
Encountered
with Exercises
(PostExercise
Analysis)
EXERCISE
PROBLEM
CODED

Identified
Problems with
ICS Incident
(PostIncident
Analysis)
INCIDENT
PROBLEM
CODED

How Many
Agencies were
Involved?
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County

Davie

Duplin

Durham

Edgecombe

Region

Piedmont

Coastal

Piedmont

Coastal

County
Population

40,035

53,843

246,896

55,606

Number of
Agency
Employees
(Sworn
Officers)

50

85

168

54

AGENCY SIZE

Medium

Medium

Large

Medium

No

Yes

Yes

No

24

104

32

24

Cross
Training
Completed
with other
agencies?

No

Rapid Deployment, Active
Shooter and other LE
responses

BLET Academy
through the Sheriff

Training
Center Open
for other
agencies

Agency
participate
in at least
one yearly
Critical
incident
Exercise?

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

How Many
Agencies
Participated
in Exercise?

All County
First
Responders

Table top Plane Crash into a
school for mass injuries

17 universities and
all County PDs

Rapid
Deployment

Cross
Training
Mandated
with other
agencies?
Hours of
Mandated
Training?
(Within
Agency)
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County

Davie

Duplin

Durham

Edgecombe

Agency in
Charge of
Coordination?

Emergency
Management

Emergency
Management

NCCU, Director
of Public Safety
of the NC System

Sheriff

N/A

N/A

None

Tactics new to
older officers

N/A

N/A

N/A

TRAINING

N/A

N/A

N/A

More Training

No

Identified
Problems
Encountered
with Exercises
(PostExercise
Analysis)
EXERCISE
PROBLEM
CODED
Possible
Solutions to
Identified
Problems
Has Agency had
an ICS Incident?

N/A

N/A

Bomb
Team/Sheriffs
Emergency
Response Team
SERT

INCIDENT

NO

NO

YES

NO

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Sheriff, PD,
NCSBI

N/A

Identified
Problems with
ICS Incident
(PostIncident
Analysis)
INCIDENT
PROBLEM
CODED

How Many
Agencies were
Involved?
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County

Forsyth

Franklin

Gaston

Gates

Region

Piedmont

Piedmont

Piedmont

Coastal

County
Population

306,607

55,100

202,535

13,154

Number of
Agency
Employees
(Sworn
Officers)

257

56

115

11

AGENCY SIZE

Large

Medium

Large

Small

No

No

No

No

60

64

40

36

Cross
Training
Completed
with other
agencies?

Both Forsyth
and Winston
PD work the
Coliseum

occasionally

Specialized Teams
Bomb, Regional
Tactical

K‐9 training
with Rocky
Mount PD

Agency
participate
in at least
one yearly
Critical
incident
Exercise?

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

How Many
Agencies
Participated
in Exercise?

Winston‐
Salem,
Kernersville,
and Forsyth
participated
in a ICE
storm event

N/A

N/A

2 Chowan
County SO
and Gates SO

Cross
Training
Mandated
with other
agencies?
Hours of
Mandated
Training?
(Within
Agency)
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County

Forsyth

Franklin

Gaston

Gates

Agency in
Charge of
Coordination?

Emergency
Management

Emergency
Management

None

Andy Bunch EM

People not using
proper forms and
submission of
proper paperwork

Less Organized
Not using
Incident
Management in
every situation

N/A

N/A

ORGAN

ORGAN

N/A

N/A

Possible
Solutions to
Identified
Problems

More training and
non‐reliance on
technology

N/A

More Viper
Radios

N/A

Has Agency had
an ICS Incident?

Weather related

N/A

Barricaded
Mental Subject

N/A

INCIDENT

YES

NO

YES

NO

everything went
real well except
for
communications

N/A

Communications

N/A

COMM

N/A

COMM

N/A

N/A

2 LE, Emergency
Management,
Fire and EMS

N/A

Identified
Problems
Encountered
with Exercises
(PostExercise
Analysis)
EXERCISE
PROBLEM
CODED

Identified
Problems with
ICS Incident
(PostIncident
Analysis)
INCIDENT
PROBLEM
CODED

How Many
Agencies were
Involved?

Everybody from
the Feds Down
(all county LE
agencies
represented)
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County

Graham

Granville

Greene

Guilford

Region

Mountain

Piedmont

Piedmont

Piedmont

County
Population

12,000

55,500

20,000

433,000

Number of
Agency
Employees
(Sworn
Officers)

12

49

28

247

AGENCY SIZE

Small

Small

Small

Large

No

No

No

No

28

24

24

48

Cross
Training
Completed
with other
agencies?

occasionally

occasionally

Only through the
community College

Only
Specialized
Units

Agency
participate
in at least
one yearly
Critical
incident
Exercise?

No

Yes

No

Yes

How Many
Agencies
Participated
in Exercise?

N/A

7 LE agencies, Fire, EMS

N/A

5 LE

Cross
Training
Mandated
with other
agencies?
Hours of
Mandated
Training?
(Within
Agency)
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County

Graham

Granville

Greene

Guilford

N/A

Emergency
Management,
Brian Short

N/A

National Guard

N/A

N/A

N/A

Only The
National Guard

N/A

N/A

N/A

ORGAN

Possible
Solutions to
Identified
Problems

N/A

N/A

N/A

Unknown

Has Agency had
an ICS Incident?

N/A

N/A

N/A

Barricaded
Subject

INCIDENT

NO

NO

NO

YES

N/A

N/A

N/A

None

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

6 total, 2 LE and
4 support

Agency in
Charge of
Coordination?
Identified
Problems
Encountered
with Exercises
(PostExercise
Analysis)
EXERCISE
PROBLEM
CODED

Identified
Problems with
ICS Incident
(PostIncident
Analysis)
INCIDENT
PROBLEM
CODED

How Many
Agencies were
Involved?
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County

Halifax

Harnett

Haywood

Henderson

Region

Piedmont

Piedmont

Mountain

Mountain

County
Population

54,242

106,283

54,033

102,367

Number of
Agency
Employees
(Sworn
Officers)

65

101

53

55

AGENCY SIZE

Medium

Large

Medium

Medium

No

No

No

No

24

42

24

32

Cross
Training
Completed
with other
agencies?

No

Domestic Violence, Sims
training

Yes

Rapid
Deployment

Agency
participate
in at least
one yearly
Critical
incident
Exercise?

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

How Many
Agencies
Participated
in Exercise?

Rapid
Deployment,
all In house

SO and Sanford PD

Tunnel Collapse SO,
PD, Fire, EMS, and
Emergency
Management

N/A

Cross
Training
Mandated
with other
agencies?
Hours of
Mandated
Training?
(Within
Agency)
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County

Halifax

Harnett

Haywood

Henderson

Agency in
Charge of
Coordination?

SO

SO

Emergency
Management

N/A

N/A

The training
needs to be as
realistic as
possible

None

N/A

N/A

TRAINING

N/A

N/A

N/A

more planning
involved in the
role play

N/A

N/A

Has Agency had
an ICS Incident?

Weather related

Car Chase with
multiple agencies
with an armed
bank robber

I‐40 Rock Slide

N/A

INCIDENT

YES

YES

YES

NO

N/A

could not stop
the suspect
vehicle

N/A

N/A

N/A

ORGAN

N/A

N/A

4 LE agencies

All County first
responders took
shifts until
Interstate was
cleared

N/A

Identified
Problems
Encountered
with Exercises
(PostExercise
Analysis)
EXERCISE
PROBLEM
CODED
Possible
Solutions to
Identified
Problems

Identified
Problems with
ICS Incident
(PostIncident
Analysis)
INCIDENT
PROBLEM
CODED

How Many
Agencies were
Involved?

SHP, PD, and all
surrounding LE
agencies
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County

Hertford

Hoke

Iredell

Jackson

Region

Coastal

Piedmont

Piedmont

Mountain

County
Population

22,604

41,016

146,206

36,500

Number of
Agency
Employees
(Sworn
Officers)

23

64

120

55

AGENCY SIZE

Small

Medium

Large

Medium

No

No

No

No

32

28

24

32

Cross
Training
Mandated
with other
agencies?
Hours of
Mandated
Training?
(Within
Agency)
Cross
Training
Completed
with other
agencies?

None

Yes

Just have started

Only when
we train
through the
Community
College

Agency
participate
in at least
one yearly
Critical
incident
Exercise?

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Active Shooter High School
SHP, SO, EMS

McGuire Nuke
Plant Exercise 5
Counties with all
Local Jurisdictions
within those

N/A

How Many
Agencies
Participated
in Exercise?

Active
Shooter
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County

Hertford

Hoke

Iredell

Jackson

Agency in
Charge of
Coordination?

Open to all
Agencies

SO

NRC

N/A

Communications

Unknown

Manpower (lack
Of)

N/A

COMM

N/A

ORGAN

N/A

Better Training
and more Like
Frequency use

N/A

More Bodies
during the
training

N/A

Yes, Apartment
complex fire

Identified
Problems
Encountered
with Exercises
(PostExercise
Analysis)
EXERCISE
PROBLEM
CODED
Possible
Solutions to
Identified
Problems

Has Agency had
an ICS Incident?

N/A

N/A

Officer Involved
Shooting with
Statesville PD
and Three other
agencies all LE
SBI, Wilkes and
PD and SHP

INCIDENT

NO

NO

YES

YES

N/A

N/A

Communications
and lack of
implementation
of NIMS

N/A

N/A

N/A

COMM AND
ORGAN

N/A

4 LE Total

All Fire, Police,
EMS and Rescue
within the
County

Identified
Problems with
ICS Incident
(PostIncident
Analysis)
INCIDENT
PROBLEM
CODED

How Many
Agencies were
Involved?

N/A

N/A
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County

Johnston

Jones

Lee

Lincoln

Region

Piedmont

Coastal

Piedmont

Piedmont

County
Population

166,843

10,500

60,107

70,914

Number of
Agency
Employees
(Sworn
Officers)

93

13

50

95

AGENCY SIZE

Medium

Small

Medium

Medium

No

No

No

Yes

24

24

48

24

Rapid
Deployment
with Anti‐
Terrorism

Cross
Training
Mandated
with other
agencies?
Hours of
Mandated
Training?
(Within
Agency)
Cross
Training
Completed
with other
agencies?

Specialized
Units,
Tactical and
Swift Water
Rescue

None

Additional In‐
Service Driver
Training,
Bloodborne and
Hazmat

Agency
participate
in at least
one yearly
Critical
incident
Exercise?

Yes

No

No

No

How Many
Agencies
Participated
in Exercise?

2 LE, Fire,
EMS &
Emergency
Management

N/A

N/A

N/A
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County

Johnston

Jones

Lee

Lincoln

Agency in
Charge of
Coordination?

SO

N/A

N/A

N/A

Communications

N/A

N/A

N/A

COMM

N/A

N/A

N/A

Possible
Solutions to
Identified
Problems

None

N/A

N/A

N/A

Has Agency had
an ICS Incident?

N/A

N/A

N/A

Yes, Student with
a gun at high
school

INCIDENT

NO

NO

NO

YES

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Everybody

Identified
Problems
Encountered
with Exercises
(PostExercise
Analysis)
EXERCISE
PROBLEM
CODED

Identified
Problems with
ICS Incident
(PostIncident
Analysis)
INCIDENT
PROBLEM
CODED

How Many
Agencies were
Involved?
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County

Macon

Martin

McDowell

Mecklenburg

Region

Mountain

Coastal

Mountain

Piedmont

County
Population

31,200

25,593

42,151

902,803

Number of
Agency
Employees
(Sworn
Officers)

46

34

45

350

AGENCY SIZE

Small

Small

Small

Large

No

No

Yes

Yes

32

24

40

66

Cross
Training
Mandated
with other
agencies?
Hours of
Mandated
Training?
(Within
Agency)
Cross
Training
Completed
with other
agencies?

Firearms and
Drivers
Training
enhancement

No

Rapid Response

Yes,
Independent
Training
Academy
with Char.
Mech. Police
Department

Agency
participate
in at least
one yearly
Critical
incident
Exercise?

No

Yes

Yes

No

How Many
Agencies
Participated
in Exercise?

N/A

15 or 16 agencies 4 LE (3
County Event)

2 LE

N/A
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County

Macon

Martin

McDowell

Mecklenburg

Agency in
Charge of
Coordination?

N/A

Emergency
Management

SO

N/A

N/A

None

Not enough
Training funding

N/A

N/A

N/A

TRAINING

N/A

Possible
Solutions to
Identified
Problems

N/A

N/A

More Funding

N/A

Has Agency had
an ICS Incident?

N/A

Missing Persons
and Homicides

Jail Escape

No

INCIDENT

NO

YES

YES

NO

N/A

Communications

Communications

N/A

N/A

COMM

COMM

N/A

N/A

13 counties w/I
DPR

All State and
Local in County

N/A

Identified
Problems
Encountered
with Exercises
(PostExercise
Analysis)
EXERCISE
PROBLEM
CODED

Identified
Problems with
ICS Incident
(PostIncident
Analysis)
INCIDENT
PROBLEM
CODED

How Many
Agencies were
Involved?
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County

Mitchell

Montgomery

Moore

Nash

Region

Mountain

Piedmont

Piedmont

Piedmont

County
Population

15,850

28,262

83,000

90,710

Number of
Agency
Employees
(Sworn
Officers)

13

37

75

76

AGENCY SIZE

Small

Small

Medium

Medium

No

Yes

No

No

24

32

32

24

Cross
Training
Completed
with other
agencies?

Community
College

Legal Policy Updates

Specific Duty
Required

Yes Job
specific

Agency
participate
in at least
one yearly
Critical
incident
Exercise?

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

How Many
Agencies
Participated
in Exercise?

Community
College
(Mayland)

Rapid Deployment 4 LE
agencies

5 or 6 LE agencies

Rapid
Deployment

Cross
Training
Mandated
with other
agencies?
Hours of
Mandated
Training?
(Within
Agency)
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County

Mitchell

Montgomery

Moore

Nash

Agency in
Charge of
Coordination?

LE coordinator

SO

Emergency
Management

SO

None

None

None

Communications

N/A

N/A

N/A

COMM

Possible
Solutions to
Identified
Problems

N/A

N/A

N/A

Viper

Has Agency had
an ICS Incident?

Armed Individual
streets of Spruce
Pine

No

Nursing Home
Shooting

None

INCIDENT

YES

NO

YES

NO

None

No

None

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

SO, Spruce Pine,
SHP

N/A

6 LE agencies
Responded

N/A

Identified
Problems
Encountered
with Exercises
(PostExercise
Analysis)
EXERCISE
PROBLEM
CODED

Identified
Problems with
ICS Incident
(PostIncident
Analysis)
INCIDENT
PROBLEM
CODED

How Many
Agencies were
Involved?
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County

New
Hanover

Onslow

Orange

Pamlico

Region

Coastal

Coastal

Piedmont

Coastal

County
Population

184,120

175,000

140,000

13,900

Number of
Agency
Employees
(Sworn
Officers)

320

118

130

14

AGENCY SIZE

Large

Large

Large

Small

No

No

No

Yes

40

32

100

40

Cross
Training
Completed
with other
agencies?

Through the
Community
College

Team Specific

Varies from Min to
over 100 per
officer

Rapid
Deployment
Training

Agency
participate
in at least
one yearly
Critical
incident
Exercise?

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

How Many
Agencies
Participated
in Exercise?

ICS, Weather,
Jail Evac, Flu
Mass Service

Mctiffer Training, w/
Multiple Agency

Table Top
/University of
North Carolina
Fire, EMS, LE
Active Shooter

Rapid
Deployment
5 LE
agencies

Cross
Training
Mandated
with other
agencies?
Hours of
Mandated
Training?
(Within
Agency)
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County

New Hanover

Onslow

Orange

Pamlico

Jacksonville PD

UNC Police
Department Col.
Hare

SO

Communications

Agency in
Charge of
Coordination?

Chief Hines, SO

Identified
Problems
Encountered
with Exercises
(PostExercise
Analysis)

Money, Lack of/
Dedicated
Equipment
(computer,
infrastructure)

Communications

Not Broad
enough‐Other
Disciplines
(Utilities,
Maintenance)
and
Communications

EXERCISE
PROBLEM
CODED

TRAINING

COMM

ORGAN

COMM

Possible
Solutions to
Identified
Problems

Dedicated
Equipment for the
Event

Everyone needs
to be on the same
frequency

More Training
and
standardized
Communications

Gave all LE
Radios in other
Agencies

Active Shooter in
School

Has Agency had
an ICS Incident?

Hurricanes,
Missing Persons,
Major Crimes
Task‐Forces

None

UNC Campus
Suspect Drove
Vehicle through
Pitt/ Active
Shooter in
School

INCIDENT

YES

NO

YES

YES

None great
response times

Identified
Problems with
ICS Incident
(PostIncident
Analysis)

Practice, Practice,
Practice

None

Training,
Communications,
Media Relations
(Chapel Hill
Police) Kevin
Gunter Excellent
Use of PIO

INCIDENT
PROBLEM
CODED

TRAINING

N/A

TRAINING AND
COMM

N/A

N/A

5 LE Unknown
number of
Support
Agencies

4 LE agencies

How Many
Agencies were
Involved?

7 agencies all LE
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County

Pender

Perquimans

Person

Pitt

Region

Coastal

Coastal

Piedmont

Coastal

County
Population

48,000

11,368

35,623

152,068

Number of
Agency
Employees
(Sworn
Officers)

80

11

42

138

AGENCY SIZE

Medium

Small

Small

Large

No

No

Yes

No

28

24

60

48

Cross
Training
Mandated
with other
agencies?
Hours of
Mandated
Training?
(Within
Agency)

Cross
Training
Completed
with other
agencies?

Yes

None

Min to 50 to 60
Hours

Just
beginning to
coordinate
all law
enforcement
agencies in
the county
for active
shooter
training

Agency
participate
in at least
one yearly
Critical
incident
Exercise?

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

How Many
Agencies
Participated
in Exercise?

Rapid
Deployment/
Tabletop
Exercise

Active Shooter in
Schools

Pitt County
SO, Craven
County SO,
New Bern
PD, SHP,
Wildlife

N/A
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County

Pender

Perquimans

Person

Pitt

Agency in
Charge of
Coordination?

SO and
Emergency
Management

N/A

Emergency
Management

Emergency
Management

N/A

N/A

Need more
training

None

N/A

N/A

TRAINING

N/A

N/A

Identified
Problems
Encountered
with Exercises
(PostExercise
Analysis)
EXERCISE
PROBLEM
CODED
Possible
Solutions to
Identified
Problems

N/A

N/A

More Training all
officers are NIMS
certified and
more
communications

Has Agency had
an ICS Incident?

Fumes in School

N/A

No

N/A

INCIDENT

YES

NO

NO

NO

None

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

HazMat, EM, Fire

N/A

N/A

N/A

Identified
Problems with
ICS Incident
(PostIncident
Analysis)
INCIDENT
PROBLEM
CODED

How Many
Agencies were
Involved?

112

County

Polk

Robeson

Rockingham

Rowan

Region

Mountain

Piedmont

Piedmont

Piedmont

County
Population

18,866

129,931

91,928

136,254

Number of
Agency
Employees
(Sworn
Officers)

22

136

110

131

AGENCY SIZE

Small

Large

Large

Large

No

No

No

No

32

36

30

24

Cross
Training
Completed
with other
agencies?

Yes

Yes, Our classes are open to
all LE

Taser
Recertification

No

Agency
participate
in at least
one yearly
Critical
incident
Exercise?

Yes

Yes

No

No

How Many
Agencies
Participated
in Exercise?

Response to
Critical‐
incidents
(Roadway
Spill‐
HAZMAT)

Yes, Rapid Deployment with
HAZMAT option

N/A

N/A

Cross
Training
Mandated
with other
agencies?
Hours of
Mandated
Training?
(Within
Agency)
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County

Polk

Robeson

Rockingham

Rowan

Agency in
Charge of
Coordination?

Emergency
Management

SO

N/A

N/A

None

None

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Has Agency had
an ICS Incident?

N/A

multi homicide
case with
numerous LE
agencies

Search

Nothing that we
did not handle
internally

INCIDENT

NO

YES

YES

NO

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

10 agencies

N/A

Identified
Problems
Encountered
with Exercises
(PostExercise
Analysis)
EXERCISE
PROBLEM
CODED
Possible
Solutions to
Identified
Problems

Identified
Problems with
ICS Incident
(PostIncident
Analysis)
INCIDENT
PROBLEM
CODED

How Many
Agencies were
Involved?
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County

Rutherford

Stokes

Surry

Swain

Region

Mountain

Piedmont

Mountain

Mountain

County
Population

65,000

46,168

73,000

13,445

Number of
Agency
Employees
(Sworn
Officers)

60

40

68

17

AGENCY SIZE

Medium

Small

Medium

Small

No

No

No

No

40

24

32

24

Cross
Training
Completed
with other
agencies?

Yes, Driver
Training
with other
LE agencies

SWAT Training w special
units

Tazer Training
with other LE
agencies

Incident
Management
and Active
Shooter

Agency
participate
in at least
one yearly
Critical
incident
Exercise?

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

How Many
Agencies
Participated
in Exercise?

Training
with Polk
County SO
Active
Shooter

Active Shooter with all
County Police in a High
School

Active Shooter, or
the Hospital Mass
Critical‐incident
(hostage event)

N/A

Cross
Training
Mandated
with other
agencies?
Hours of
Mandated
Training?
(Within
Agency)
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County

Rutherford

Stokes

Surry

Swain

Agency in
Charge of
Coordination?

Emergency
Management

SO

Emergency
Management

N/A

Not Realistic
Senarios

Unknown

More Training

N/A

TRAINING

N/A

TRAINING

N/A

More Training

Unknown

Need More
Training

N/A

Has Agency had
an ICS Incident?

No

Officer Shot/ at
least 30 LE
agencies
represented

N/A

No

INCIDENT

NO

YES

NO

NO

N/A

Communications

N/A

N/A

N/A

COMM

N/A

N/A

N/A

30 LE agencies

N/A

N/A

Identified
Problems
Encountered
with Exercises
(PostExercise
Analysis)
EXERCISE
PROBLEM
CODED
Possible
Solutions to
Identified
Problems

Identified
Problems with
ICS Incident
(PostIncident
Analysis)
INCIDENT
PROBLEM
CODED

How Many
Agencies were
Involved?

116

County

Transylvania

Vance

Wake

Watauga

Region

Mountain

Piedmont

Piedmont

Mountain

County
Population

29,334

45,000

866,410

42,695

Number of
Agency
Employees
(Sworn
Officers)

55

44

356

42

AGENCY SIZE

Medium

Medium

Large

Medium

No

No

No

Yes

44

32

36

24

Rapid
Deployment

Cross
Training
Mandated
with other
agencies?
Hours of
Mandated
Training?
(Within
Agency)
Cross
Training
Completed
with other
agencies?

Firearms,
Legal
Updates

Specialized Teams, K‐9 only

Training Center is
open to all Law
Enforcement
Agencies

Agency
participate
in at least
one yearly
Critical
incident
Exercise?

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

N/A

Haz Mat
Event,
Boone, ASU,
Fire, SO, NC
National
Guard,
Emergency
Management

How Many
Agencies
Participated
in Exercise?

Bio hazard
Event

Active Shooter Exercise at
High School with 7 LE
agencies
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County

Transylvania

Vance

Wake

Watauga

Agency in
Charge of
Coordination?

Emergency
Management

Emergency
Management
Brian Short 252‐
438‐8264

N/A

Emergency
Management

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Possible
Solutions to
Identified
Problems

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Has Agency had
an ICS Incident?

N/A

N/A

No

No

INCIDENT

NO

NO

NO

NO

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Identified
Problems
Encountered
with Exercises
(PostExercise
Analysis)
EXERCISE
PROBLEM
CODED

Identified
Problems with
ICS Incident
(PostIncident
Analysis)
INCIDENT
PROBLEM
CODED

How Many
Agencies were
Involved?
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County

Wayne

Wilkes

Wilson

Yancey

Region

Piedmont

Mountain

Piedmont

Mountain

County
Population

130,000

66,492

78,224

18,421

Number of
Agency
Employees
(Sworn
Officers)

85

72

70

14

AGENCY SIZE

Medium

Medium

Medium

Small

No

No

Yes

No

24

24

40

24

Cross
Training
Completed
with other
agencies?

Wilson Tech
or Costal
Plain
Community
College

Special Teams Tactical,
Bomb Only

Driver Training,
Rapid Deployment
each year

Through the
Community
College
(Mayland)

Agency
participate
in at least
one yearly
Critical
incident
Exercise?

Yes

No

Yes

No

How Many
Agencies
Participated
in Exercise?

Orbit Comet
Seymore
Johnson AFB,
Goldsboro
PD,
Emergency
Management

N/A

Wilson PD,
Stantonburg PD,
Black Creek PD,
Johnston County
Sheriff Sharpsburg
PD & Emergency
Management

N/A

Cross
Training
Mandated
with other
agencies?
Hours of
Mandated
Training?
(Within
Agency)
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County

Wayne

Wilkes

Wilson

Yancey

Agency in
Charge of
Coordination?

Air Force

N/A

Emergency
Management

N/A

None

N/A

Communications,
not one
jurisdiction is on
the same
frequency band

N/A

N/A

N/A

COMM

N/A

N/A

N/A

More Training
and a universal
radio system for
all county
agencies

N/A

Has Agency had
an ICS Incident?

None

Yes, Lost
Individuals,
hostage situation,
Wild land fires

Plane Crash, 7
agencies
involved

Floods, large
structure fires

INCIDENT

NO

YES

YES

YES

N/A

Communications

Communications,
and
jurisdictional
problems

Communications

N/A

COMM

COMM AND
ORGAN

COMM

N/A

At least 3 LE
agencies,
mulitple EMS,
Fire Departments
& Emergency
Management

3 LE (SO, City
and SHP) EM and
3 Fire
Departments

All first
responder
agencies in the
County as well as
the State and
National Guard

Identified
Problems
Encountered
with Exercises
(PostExercise
Analysis)
EXERCISE
PROBLEM
CODED
Possible
Solutions to
Identified
Problems

Identified
Problems with
ICS Incident
(PostIncident
Analysis)
INCIDENT
PROBLEM
CODED

How Many
Agencies were
Involved?
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